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Abstract 
This report documents the key safety and operational aspects of a Z-pinch Externally Driven 
Nuclear Assembly (ZEDNA) reactor concept which is envisioned to be built and operated at the 
Z-machine facility in Technical Area IV.  Operating parameters and reactor neutronic conditions 
are established that would meet the design requirements of the system.  Accident and off-normal 
conditions are analyzed using a point-kinetics, one-dimensional thermo-mechanical code 
developed specifically for ZEDNA applications.  Downwind dose calculations are presented to 
determine the potential dose to the collocated worker and public in the event of a hypothetical 
catastrophic accident.  Current and magnetic impulse modeling and the debris shield design are 
examined for the interface between the Z machine and the ZEDNA.  This work was performed 
as part of the Advanced Fusion Grand Challenge Laboratory Directed Research and Develop-
ment Program.  The conclusion of this work is that the ZEDNA concept is feasible and could be 
operated at the Z-machine facility without undue risk to collocated workers and the public. 
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1 Executive Summary 
Pulse neutron radiation fields are needed for Defense Programs’ requirements and for the 
definition and certification of weapons systems.  The Sandia Pulsed Reactor III (SPR-III) at 
Sandia National Laboratories (SNL) is a fast-burst reactor (FBR) used for weapons effects 
testing.  However, SPR-III has significant security costs because it uses highly-enriched uranium 
(HEU) which is at high risk for proliferation.  The SPR-III has been shut down permanently as of 
October 2006.  One other FBR exists at the White Sands Missile Range, but falls short of the 
capabilities of SPR-III.  A low-enriched uranium (LEU) FBR would overcome the security cost 
issues, but this type of reactor has a significantly larger pulse width and is susceptible to pre-
initiation from spontaneous neutrons generated in the uranium-238 (U-238).   
 
A potential solution is to use an LEU reactor as a prompt neutron multiplier driven with an 
external pulsed-neutron source.  This externally-driven nuclear assembly (EDNA) is a class of 
reactor concepts that has been proposed with various drivers.  One concept uses a short-pulse 
electron beam impinging on a high-Z target to produce the neutron pulse.  Another uses very 
high-energy protons (near 1 GeV) hitting a high-Z target (or the reactor itself).  This report 
describes a concept that uses a pulsed-neutron source from a Z-pinch inertial confinement fusion 
(ICF) device being developed at SNL (the Z machine).  The reactor concept that uses this source 
is called a Z-pinch Externally Driven Nuclear Assembly (ZEDNA).  In principle, a strong 
enough Z-pinch fusion source would be all that is needed for radiation testing.  But in practice, 
the neutron multiplication that occurs within the reactor allows the use of a Z-pinch source that is 
hundreds of times smaller than would otherwise be needed.  This feature makes the ZEDNA 
concept an attractive option for replacing the SPR-III in the near term.   
 
This report follows a previous document (Parma, et al., 2007) that described the details of the 
ZEDNA concept, its potential capabilities, and its ability to meet the same neutronic testing 
requirements imposed on the SPR-III.  This report describes additional work performed in the 
third year of the Advanced Fusion Grand Challenge LDRD.  It documents some of the key safety 
and operational aspects of the ZEDNA reactor concept which is envisioned to be built and 
operated at the Z-machine facility in Technical Area IV (TA-IV).  Operating parameters and 
reactor neutronic conditions are established that would meet the design requirements of the 
system.  Accident and off-normal conditions are analyzed using a point-kinetics, one-
dimensional thermo-mechanical code developed specifically for ZEDNA applications.  
Downwind dose calculations are presented to determine the potential dose to the collocated 
worker and public in the event of a hypothetical catastrophic accident.  Current and magnetic 
impulse modeling and the debris shield design are examined for the interface between the Z 
machine and the ZEDNA.  The conclusion of this work is that the ZEDNA concept is feasible 
and could be operated at the Z-machine facility without undue risk to collocated workers and the 
public. 
 
Although this work is primarily focused on Defense Programs needs for certification of weapons 
systems, the ZEDNA machine could play an important role in developing advocacy for a future 
nuclear waste transmutation application, since it would produce vital data on fission-fusion 
hybrid systems.  The ZEDNA would provide testing capabilities to validate transmutation 
kinetics models (Cipiti, et al., 2006). 
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2 Introduction 
The needs for an EDNA device and the proposed ZEDNA concept have been described in detail 
in a previous report (Parma, et al., 2007).  The basic premise is that there is a need for a short 
pulse neutron source that can deliver neutron fluences on the order of 6.1 x 1014 nvt with a pulse 
width of about 75 μs.  The SPR-III reactor is an FBR at SNL that can meet these requirements 
but has been permanently shut down due to the security cost associated with protecting the HEU 
fuel.  An LEU FBR would not be capable of meeting the pulse-width requirement and would not 
be reliable due to an inherently high pre-initiation probability.  An EDNA concept would use an 
external pulse neutron source to generate the initial population of neutrons that would then be 
multiplied in a reactor that is in a supercritical state.  A concept called the ZEDNA has been 
proposed that would use the Z-machine located in TA-IV at SNL to produce the initial pulse of 
neutrons.  The ZEDNA reactor would be in close proximity to the source to allow for effective 
multiplication of the initial neutrons and generate the neutron fluence and pulse widths similar to 
that which the SPR-III reactor can produce.   
This report follows a previous document (Parma, et al., 2007) that described the details of the 
ZEDNA concept, its potential capabilities, and its ability to meet the same neutronic testing 
requirements imposed on the SPR-III.  This report includes additional work performed in the 
third year of the Advanced Fusion Grand Challenge LDRD.  This report documents some of the 
key safety and operational aspects of the ZEDNA reactor concept which is envisioned to be built 
and operated at the Z-machine facility in TA-IV.  Operating parameters and reactor neutronic 
conditions are established that would meet the design requirements of the system.  Accident and 
off-normal conditions are analyzed using a point-kinetics, one-dimensional thermo-mechanical 
code developed specifically for ZEDNA applications.  Downwind dose calculations are 
presented to determine the potential dose to the collocated worker and public in the event of a 
hypothetical catastrophic accident.  Current and magnetic impulse modeling and the debris shield 
design are examined for the interface between the Z machine and the ZEDNA.  The conclusion 
of this work is that the ZEDNA concept is feasible and could be operated at the Z-machine 
facility without undue risk to collocated workers and the public. 
 
The ZEDNA concept is comprised of a small reactor situated just below the fusion target of the 
Z machine, as shown in Figure 2-1.  The reactor fuel consists of annular discs of uranium metal 
alloyed with 10 percent molybdenum (U-10Mo).  The enrichment is slightly less than 20%, 
which allows ZEDNA to be characterized as LEU and minimal security costs.  The center of the 
reactor core has a cavity 20 cm in diameter to accommodate the test objects.  The nominal pulse 
environment desired within the cavity is a total fluence of 6.1 x 1014 n/cm2 with a full-width half-
maximum (FWHM) of 76 microseconds.  These conditions replicate the conditions within the 
SPR-III reactor.  The ZEDNA would be driven by approximately 4 x 1015 14-MeV neutrons 
produced by the Z machine with a D-T reaction.  Scaling from past Z performance for D-D 
yields, this requirement does not seem unrealistic for the near future.  However, a D-T yield of 
this magnitude has yet to be demonstrated on Z. 
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Figure 2-1.  Overview of the ZEDNA Concept and the Z Machine. 
The reactor would be stored in the basement below the Z facility in a shielded storage vault when 
not in use.  When a test is needed, the experimenters would set up their test article below the Z 
machine.  The experimenters would place the test object into a metal basket supported from a 
light aluminum table, similar to the method used in SPR-III.  After the experimenters left the 
basement and the area was secured, the reactor would be moved on tracks, via remote handling, 
until it was below the basket and table.  A modified vacuum chamber at the center of the Z 
machine would allow for the experiment package to be picked up by the reactor and raised to 
within close proximity to the Z target.  A heavy-duty lift would move the reactor upward 
allowing the basket to enter the reactor cavity and lifting the table.  The reactor would continue 
upward to its final position in close proximity to the target.  The reactor would be operated in air 
within its own confinement vessel.  The modified vacuum chamber boundary would be formed 
by a cylinder and thimble inserted from below to allow access to the Magnetically Insulated 
Transmission Line (MITL) and fusion target.  Only a pumped annular region and the MITL itself 
would be in a vacuum.  The top of the thimble would be thick enough to withstand the impact of 
debris created from the Z shot. 
The Z machine would be charged (charging time approximately three minutes) and the reactor 
brought to a multiplication (keff) of 1.006, which is $0.80 supercritical - equivalent to a reactor 
period of ~1 second (the reactor period is defined as the time required to change the reactor 
power by e1=2.72).  The reactor in this reactivity state allows several seconds for the Z machine 
to fire.  The neutrons produced by the shot are multiplied within the reactor by about a factor of 
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750.  The reactor “pulse” is terminated by the depletion of the prompt neutrons, since the 
reactivity would be below the prompt-critical condition (reactivity equal to $1.00).  The reactor 
would then shut down by moving the control reflector elements to their least reactive state.  In 
addition, an inherent negative reactivity effect from thermal expansion of the fuel ensures reactor 
shutdown. 
 
After the shot, the reactor would be lowered allowing the table and basket to slide out of the 
cavity for later access.  The reactor would be moved remotely to the shielded storage vault.  The 
experimenters would then have access to the test object after a short wait time, similar to the 
process in SPR-III. 
 
The results of the calculations for the pulse yield for various values of keff in the ZEDNA reactor 
are plotted in Figure 2-2.  The source value has been scaled so that the integrated fluence in the 
central cavity of the reactor is equal to that of the SPR-III (6.1 x 1014 n/cm2).  This summary plot 
shows the design options for the ZEDNA system.  As the capability of the Z machine to produce 
fusion neutrons increases, the amount of reactivity needed for the reactor can be decreased.  
Eventually, this could allow operation of the reactor in the subcritical region, if desired.  Or, if 
there is an interest in the difference in pulse width on radiation effects, the pulse width can be 
changed while the total fluence is kept fixed simply by adjusting the Z yield and the reactor keff.  
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Figure 2-2.  Pulsed Source Requirement vs. keff to Yield 6.1x10
14 n/cm2. 
The ZEDNA concept is technically feasible.  The purpose of this work was to examine the safety 
and operational conditions of the concept in greater detail.  This investigation allows for the 
safety risk associated with the construction and operation of the ZEDNA device to be more fully 
understood. 
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3 Operation and Control of the ZEDNA 
The pulse operation of an EDNA device is different than that of an FBR.  An FBR must operate 
in the super-prompt critical regime to generate a pulse and must maintain the weak source 
conditions, prior to the rapid addition of reactivity by the pulse element.  An EDNA device 
operates in a supercritical, critical, or subcritical state with a power level of milliwatts or watts, 
prior to the external pulse of neutrons.  An FBR must have inherent negative reactivity feedback 
to terminate the pulse excursion.  An EDNA device does not require the inherent shutdown to 
terminate the pulse, since the device operates in a sub-prompt critical condition.  Both devices 
require engineered shutdown and control mechanisms to safely operate and shutdown the 
reactors. 
An EDNA device can operate in a supercritical, critical, or subcritical state, depending on the 
required prompt neutron multiplication to attain the desired neutron fluence.  The pulse of initial, 
externally-produced neutrons can be external or internal to the core (within the fuel or cavity 
region), and can have any energy spectrum.  The effectiveness of the initial neutrons in fission 
production of the first generation of prompt neutrons is dependent on the source geometry and 
initial neutron energy spectrum.  The external neutron pulse must be of short duration compared 
to the desired pulse duration for the reactor.  For a desired pulse width on the order of 80 μs, the 
external pulse neutron duration must be less than ~5 μs.  A Z-machine neutron pulse is on the 
order of a few nanoseconds in width. 
The prompt neutrons, produced by fission caused by the initial external neutrons, are multiplied 
in the reactor depending on the reactivity state of the reactor.  Since the reactor is sub-prompt 
critical, it cannot sustain itself using the prompt neutrons alone, as it can for an FBR that is 
super- prompt critical.  Hence, for an EDNA device, the initial set of neutrons creates a 
subsequent set of prompt fission neutrons that, in turn, creates another generation of prompt 
fission neutrons.  However, the quantity of prompt neutrons in each subsequent generation is less 
than the preceding one, and in time, eventually decreases to zero.  This process creates a pulse 
which has a rise time equal to the duration of the initial external neutron pulse and a fall time 
which has an exponential decay that is characteristic of the reactivity state of the reactor. 
Figure 3-1 shows an example comparing a typical EDNA-type pulse with a SPR-III FBR pulse.  
The plot shows reactor power as a function of time.  The reactor power is proportional to the 
neutron population in the system.  The sharp rise in power (at time equal to zero) and exponential 
decay is apparent in the EDNA pulse.  The SPR-III pulse is more symmetric because it takes 
time for the chain reaction of the super-prompt critical reactor to build up the neutron population, 
and then thermal feedback drives the reactor sub-prompt critical.  It is not clear which shape is 
better for weapons effects testing, EDNA or SPR-III.  It depends on the scenario being 
considered.  In general, the test community considers the total fluence and pulse width to be the 
most important factors, so the difference in pulse shape is not considered very important. 
Note that the SPR-III FBR pulse is to the right of the EDNA pulse.  For the SPR-III calculation, 
the reactivity was added at time equal to zero and the initial power level was assumed to be 1 
watt, but ~20 e-folding periods are required before a significant power level is achieved.  Starting 
at 1 watt, and using a reactor period of 18 μs, a power level of 1 x 109 watts (1000 MW) is not 
achieved until ~360 μs.  For the EDNA device, the reactor is on a positive period (supercritical), 
and the pulse occurs immediately upon the injection of the external source neutrons.  
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The total neutron fluence (neutron flux times time, sometimes referred to as nvt - neutrons times 
velocity times time) generated within the EDNA or FBR cavity will be directly proportional to 
the integral under the pulse curve.  The fluence and energy deposited in the EDNA increase with 
the external neutron source strength and the multiplication of the reactor.  The pulse width for 
the EDNA varies with the multiplication of the reactor.  This gives some flexibility to the EDNA 
device in simulating radiation environments of interest.  The pulse width can be changed while 
keeping the total fluence fixed by adjusting the external source intensity.   
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Figure 3-1.  ZEDNA Pulse (left) and SPR-III Pulse (right). 
3.1 ZEDNA Design and Reactivity Control 
The ZEDNA reactor design concept is shown in Figure 3-2.  The concept is shown with and 
without the reflector elements and containment shroud to allow for a more visual representation 
of the design.  The reactor itself is made up of individual metallic fuel plates that are very similar 
to the SPR-III reactor fuel plates.  The fuel plates are U-10Mo with uranium enriched to less than 
20% (as compared to SPR-III with uranium enrichment of 93%).  The plates are stacked and held 
together using high-strength steel rods.   
For the ZEDNA design, there are essentially three sets of stacked plates to form three regions of 
the core.  The outer region and upper/inner region of the core are fixed in place.  A gap separates 
the inner and outer core regions.  The lower/inner region is movable, which allows it to be mated 
or separated from the upper/inner region.  This is similar to the SPR-III design which has two 
core regions.  The lower portion, known as the safety block, is movable to allow for a large 
reactivity reduction, when desired.  The movable lower/inner region would operate using a drive 
mechanism and electromagnet which allows it to couple to the upper/inner region.  The drive 
mechanism, electromagnet, and coupling mechanisms are below the core support plate.  The two 
inner core regions have their own mounting fixtures and steel rod supports.  The core is designed 
with segmented fuel plates, rather than large diameter fuel plates, to facilitate manufacturability 
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and allow for the decoupling of the radial and tangential stresses that develop during a pulse.  
The inner portion of the core has roughly the same outer diameter as the SPR-III reactor.  The 
lower/inner movable region is moved up and down by remote operations at the control room.  
During a SCRAM,1 the movable region is dropped by gravity from its “full up” position to its 
“full down” position by de-energizing the electromagnet.  For a large pulse, the expansion of the 
core in the axial dimension would also cause enough separation from the electromagnetic 
coupling to break the magnetic flux and drop the lower core region.  When this occurs, the lower 
region is essentially “pushed” away from the upper region due to the rapid axial expansion. 
 
Stacked Fuel Plates
Movable Lower
Core Half
Experiment Cavity
Movable Copper
Reflector Elements
Containment
Vessel
 
Figure 3-2.  ZEDNA Reactor Design Concept. 
 
The control of the ZEDNA is established by using copper reflector elements that surround the 
core and can be moved up and down using electromagnetically-coupled drive mechanisms.  Four 
movable reflector elements are depicted in Figure 3-2.  The movable elements can be positioned 
at any location between “full up” and “full down” and are dropped by gravity to their “full 
down” position during a SCRAM.  The SPR-III operates in a similar manner using movable 
copper reflector elements.  The SPR-III also includes an aluminum pulse element that can be 
inserted rapidly using a pneumatic drive system.  This type of rapid insertion is not required for 
the ZEDNA reactor since it does not pulse in the same manner as an FBR. 
 
                                                 
1 SCRAM is a term used in nuclear engineering to denote the rapid shutdown in the power level of a reactor core by 
a mechanical means with the addition of negative reactivity.  The original term, SCRAM, stood for Safety Control 
Rod Ax Man.  Today it is used to denote a fast mechanical shutdown mechanism that inserts large amounts of 
negative reactivity quickly allowing for a rapid drop in the power level.  The signal to deploy this mechanism could 
be initiated manually or by instrumentation that detects a condition outside of the normal operating range. 
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Reactivity control for the ZEDNA would be only through remote operations at the control room.  
The control system would be made up of neutronic instrumentation and automatic and manual 
shutdown (SCRAM) systems.  The reactivity would controlled by the operation of the movable 
lower portion of the core, and by raising and lowering the copper reflector elements. 
A containment or confinement vessel that surrounds the core region is shown in Figure 3-2.  
SPR-III does maintain a shroud that allows for nitrogen gas cooling after a pulse, but SPR-III 
does not maintain a containment or confinement barrier around the core region.  Fission products 
are thus allowed to escape from the core and contaminate the internal surfaces of the SPR-III 
room.  For ZEDNA, a barrier would be required, since it would not be acceptable to contaminate 
the basement and lower portion of the Z vacuum stack with fission products. 
3.2 Operating Sequence 
The operation of the ZEDNA device would be as follows.  Once the Z-machine was set up for a 
pulse and the experiment package was in place on a spider arrangement, the basement and high 
bay zones of the Z facility would be cleared of all personnel and placed in a secured condition.  
ZEDNA would be moved from its storage vault in the basement to below the experiment 
package and source/vacuum stack region of the Z machine using a specially-designed track and 
remote-control mechanism.  The ZEDNA would include all of the mechanical, electrical, and 
instrumentation components to move and operate from the control room.  The ZEDNA control 
room would be located near the current Z-machine control room.  The ZEDNA would be raised 
from its carriage using a hydraulic or scissor-jack mechanism, and mated with the experiment 
package and then the Z source.  With the ZEDNA mechanically coupled to the pulse source, the 
reactor would be ready to operate. 
Certified reactor operators would coordinate the startup and pulse sequence with the Z-machine 
operators.  Neutronic instrumentation and shutdown systems would be fully functional and 
operating during the startup sequence of ZEDNA.  A startup procedure would be followed by the 
reactor operators to ensure the proper operation of all instrumentation, equipment, alarms, etc.  
When ready to operate, the operating sequence would commence.  A small, steady-state neutron 
source (such as an AmBe or PuBe source) would be raised near the fuel to ensure a sufficient 
neutron population during startup.  The movable lower portion of the core would be raised and 
electromagnetically coupled to the upper portion of the core.  The reactor would be brought to 
the delayed critical condition using the reflector elements.  The neutron source would then be 
removed and the reactor power would be adjusted to a very low level, for example, 1 watt or 
less.  When the Z-machine was within a few seconds of pulsing, the reactivity would be added 
by adjusting the control reflectors to the required positive reactivity addition, for example, $0.80.  
The reactivity would not need to be added rapidly.  At an addition rate of $0.05/sec, $0.80 of 
reactivity would be added in 16 seconds.  Once the $0.80 of reactivity was added, the reactor 
power level would be increasing exponentially with a period (e folding time) of ~0.9 seconds.  
This means that the power level of the reactor would be increasing by e1 (2.72) every 0.9 
seconds.   
Assuming an initial power level of 1 kW, and a total reactivity addition of $0.80, the reactor 
power level 5 seconds following the addition would be ~260 kW.  The amount of energy 
deposited in 5 seconds would be about 0.23 MJ.  This is a trivial quantity compared to ~25 MJ of 
energy that will be generated in the reactor following the pulse from the multiplied neutron 
source.  After the pulse occurs, a SCRAM signal would initiate the reactor shutdown.  This 
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would occur by de-energizing the electromagnets, which are part of the element drive 
mechanisms.  The movable reflector elements and the inner movable core region would fall by 
gravity to their least reactive positions.  Negative reactivity would also be added by inherent 
negative temperature effects, similar to SPR-III.  These effects are analyzed in Section 5 of this 
report. 
The EDNA reactor would be required to maintain both inherent and engineered mechanical 
safety features to ensure the reactor could be shut down rapidly by adding negative reactivity.  
The reactor and control system will need to be over designed with excess capacity and redundant 
safety features to account for potential accident conditions, such as the addtion of too much 
reactivity, or the production of too many pulse neutrons by the Z source. 
3.3 Reactivity Calculations 
The control of the ZEDNA prior to the initiation of the external pulse source is described in this 
section.  Section 5 describes the feedback of the ZEDNA during and after the pulse, as well as 
accident conditions that could be postulated for the ZEDNA.  Prior to the external neutron pulse, 
the reactor must be super critical with the correct amount of reactivity such that the desired 
prompt neutron multiplication is achieved.  Although ZEDNA would be at a very low power 
level during this operation prior to the pulse, the reactor must still be controlled to ensure that the 
reactivity addition is limited, and that the power level does not exceed a significant value.  This 
is achieved by using trained and certified operators, administrative procedures, and engineered 
control and safety features.  The engineered control features would include a limit on the 
reactivity addition rate and a “rod block” that would not allow addition of more reactivity if the 
reactor period became too short.  Safety equipment would include instrumentation that would 
provide reactor trip or SCRAM, if conditions exceed the operating range.  Safety features would 
include a period trip (SCRAM if the reactor period becomes too small) and a power level trip 
(SCRAM if the reactor power becomes too high).  In addition, other safety features would be 
included such as a time-out trip (SCRAM if the neutron pulse is not initiated within a given time 
interval following a “ready-to-fire” signal from the reactor console).  Parametric analysis must be 
performed to ensure that the delay time between initiation of a SCRAM signal and the start of 
gravity fall of the control reflectors is acceptable. 
The transient behavior of ZEDNA prior to the pulse can be modeled using point-reactor kinetics 
with delayed neutrons.  A fundamental issue that must be addressed for a control/shutdown 
system is if the reactor can be controlled and shut down without adding too much energy to the 
system that could jeopardize the integrity of the fuel.  The following analysis will be used to 
determine: 1) the limit that should be imposed on the control element reactivity addition rate; 2) 
the effectiveness in using a “rod block” condition and the value of the limiting period; 3) the 
proposed period trip condition; 4) the proposed power level trip condition; and 5) the maximum 
delay time from SCRAM initiation to control element release. 
In order to achieve the desired goal of the ZEDNA cavity fluence, using the projected D-T 
neutron source potentially available in Z, the ZEDNA must be super critical with a reactivity of 
$0.80 or more, as shown in Figure 2-2.  Once the critical condition is established at a low power 
level for the reactor, the reactivity must be added either by adjusting the control reflector 
positions, or possibly, by inserting a pulse-type element similar to that used in SPR-III.  The 
stable period associated with the addition of $0.80 is 0.9 seconds.  This implies that the reactivity 
must be added relatively quickly, and the pulse must occur within a few seconds following the 
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addition.  Although most research reactors and no power reactors operate with this short of a 
period, it is not necessarily unsafe to do so, given that enough safety features are in place to 
ensure that the fuel cannot be overheated by the addition of too much energy.  In fact, the SPR-
III reactor is routinely operated in this fashion, in what is commonly known as the mini-pulse 
mode.  For the ZEDNA, the safety issues include limiting the total amount of reactivity added 
and the total energy deposited prior to the external neutron pulse.  It is desirable to add the 
reactivity with a relatively slow ramp rate (tens of cents per second, compared to dollars per 
second), to ensure that the addition of $0.80 will not be exceeded.  However, if the reactivity is 
added too slowly, the energy deposited during the ramp could become too large and 
unacceptable. 
Figures 3-3 and 3-4 show the result of power versus time for ramp reactivity addition rates of 
$0.05/s, $0.10/s, $0.20/s and $30/s, an initial starting power level of 1.0 W, and total reactivity 
additions of $0.80 and $0.90, respectively.  The $30/s ramp is shown for perspective if a 
pneumatically driven reflector element was used to add the reactivity after the critical condition 
was established.  The other values represent typical reactivity addition rates for control elements.   
In Figure 3-3, reactivity of $0.80 is added and a stable period of ~0.9 seconds results.  For the 
ramp reactivity a addition of $0.05/s, the reactor power is ~300 W when all of the $0.80 is added 
(at 16 s).  The amount of energy deposited is the integral under the power curve.  Again, for the 
$0.05/s case, the energy deposited at 16 s is ~300 J.  Three seconds after the reactivity is added 
(19 s), the power level is 9.3 kW and the energy deposited is 8.1 kJ.  Five seconds after the 
reactivity is added (21 s), the power level is 93.5 kW and the energy deposited is 81.3 kJ.  Seven 
seconds after the reactivity is added (23 s), the power level is 937 kW and the energy deposited 
is 913 kJ.  These results indicate that the reactivity can be added at a relatively low rate ($0.05/s) 
and can achieve acceptable conditions for the Z-machine timing.  Under this scenario, the 
ZEDNA control system would send a signal to the Z-machine control system when the full $0.80 
of reactivity was added.  The Z-machine would be given 5 seconds in which to pulse.  This 
should be achievable for the Z machine.  If the Z machine did not fire within this time interval, 
the timer shut down would SCRAM the reactor.  Faster ramp rates would also achieve this goal.  
However, the faster rates could lead to the potential for the addition of too much reactivity.  For 
the SPR-III reactor, reactivity is added at $30/s to within one cent every time the reactor pulses.  
Therefore, using a pulse element to add the $0.80 of reactivity is acceptable.  Specific operating 
procedures, similar to that used for SPR-III operations, would be followed to ensure the 
reactivity of the pulse element is known. 
Figure 3-4 shows the same calculations but with a reactivity addition of $0.90.  For the ramp rate 
of $0.05/s, $0.90 is added in 18 seconds.  At 18 seconds, the power level is 26.8 kW and the 
energy is 9.1 kJ.  Three seconds later (21 s), the power level is 311 MW and the energy is 99.9 
MJ.  These values would not be acceptable and would require a smaller time-out interval.  A 
one-second interval would be more appropriate.  Increasing the ramp rate would not allow for a 
longer time-out interval, since the period for a $0.90 addition is ~0.3 seconds. 
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Figure 3-3.  Power Versus Time for a $0.80 Reactivity Addition and Different Ramp Rates. 
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Figure 3-4.  Power Versus Time for a $0.90 Reactivity Addition and Different Ramp Rates. 
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Increasing the reactivity addition beyond $0.90 would not be practical for an EDNA type device 
for two reasons.   One: although the prompt multiplication increases with increasing reactivity, 
the pulse width also increases with reactivity.  From Figure 2-2, the pulse width for a $0.80 
reactivity addition is ~64 μs, which is an acceptable value.  However, the pulse width for a $0.90 
reactivity addition is ~300 μs, which is an unacceptable value in meeting the SPR-III like goals.  
However, larger pulse widths may be desirable for testing applications currently unavailable for 
SPR-III.  If this were the case, then a larger reactivity addition could be an important design 
consideration.  Two: the reactor period becomes very short above $0.90 (less than 0.3 seconds), 
which does not allow a very large time window for the Z pulse to occur prior to the reactor 
overheating.  For larger reactivity additions, a pulse element would probably be required with 
more precise timing with the Z-machine firing. 
Figures 3-5 and 3-6 show similar calculations using a rod block feature built into the control 
system.  Using this approach, the control element reactivity addition would be limited by the 
reactor period.  If the period became too short, the system would not allow the control rod drives 
to operate. This would not apply to a pulse element driven system, if used.  The results show that 
for a rod block period limitation of 0.7 seconds (Figure 3-5), $0.83 of reactivity can be added to 
the system.  For a 0.5 second period block (Figure 3-6), $0.86 of reactivity can be added.  If the 
control elements were used to add the reactivity prior to a pulse, the rod block feature would 
ensure that the reactivity addition was limited to within these values. 
Figures 3-7 and 3-8 show results for a SCRAM initiation if the period becomes too short.  This 
safety feature would be in place if the rod block did not perform properly or if reactivity was 
added by another means unintentionally, such as inadvertent movement of the ZEDNA during 
the operation sequence.  Figure 3-7 shows the results for a 0.5 second period trip and Figure 3-8 
for a 0.3 second period trip for ramp addition rates of $0.05/s, $0.10/s, and $0.20/s.  Since some 
amount of time is required to allow for the trip signal to reach the magnet power supply, the 
magnetic flux to diminish, and the control elements to begin to fall, delay times of 0.25 and 0.5 
seconds are analyzed.  The results show that for these ramp rates, both period values and delay 
times are acceptable. 
In addition to these safety features, a power level trip would be used to SCRAM the reactor if the 
power level exceeded a set value.  A power level trip will ensure not only a limit on the reactor 
power prior to the pulse, but will ensure that a SCRAM signal is initiated during the pulse.  The 
delay in the signal will allow for the pulse and prompt multiplication to occur, but will ensure 
that negative reactivity is added to the system by a mechanical means immediately following the 
pulse.  A value of 1 MW with a delay time of 0.5 seconds would be acceptable. 
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Figure 3-5.  Power Versus Time for a 0.7 Second Rod Block and Different Ramp Rates. 
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Figure 3-6.  Power Versus Time for a 0.5 Second Rod Block and Different Ramp Rates. 
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Figure 3-7.  Power Versus Time for a 0.5 Second Period Scram and Different Ramp Rates. 
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Figure 3-8.  Power Versus Time for a 0.3 Second Period Scram and Different Ramp Rates. 
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3.4 ZEDNA Control Parameters Summary 
From the previous analysis, a number of control and safety parameters were derived for the 
ZEDNA to control reactivity addition.  Prior to the Z pulse, the ZEDNA will be brought to a 
delayed critical configuration at a low power level (10 W or less).  The delayed critical condition 
will be established by certified reactor operators using the following proposed methodology. 
 
1. The Z facility basement and high bay will be cleared and secured. 
2. Ventilation and the control console will be operating. 
3. ZEDNA will be remotely moved from its storage location in the basement to below the 
experiment package and pulse source. 
4. ZEDNA will be raised to mate with the Z source. 
5. The startup procedure will be performed to ensure all equipment and control and safety 
channels are functioning properly. 
6. The steady-state neutron source will be raised to provide a source of neutrons for 
establishing a delayed critical condition. 
7. The movable portion of the reactor will be raised and electromagnetically coupled to the 
upper region of the core. 
8. The control reflector elements will be raised and adjusted to reach the delayed critical 
condition. 
9. The steady-state neutron source will be lowered since it is no longer required once the 
delayed critical condition is established. 
10. The power level of ZEDNA will be adjusted to below 10 W. 
11. A signal will be sent to the Z machine operators to begin charging procedure. 
12. A signal will be sent from the Z machine to the ZEDNA console when the Z machine is 
charged and ready to fire. 
13. The required additional reactivity ($0.80) will be added to the ZEDNA either by the 
control elements or a pulse element. 
14. A “fire” signal will be sent to the Z-machine console. 
15. A time-out interval will SCRAM the reactor if the Z-machine fails to fire within the time 
period. 
16. A successful firing of the Z machine will result in a pulse.  Temperature and neutronic 
instrumentation will record the event. 
17. During the pulse, a high power SCRAM will be initiated.  The control elements and 
movable core region will drop after the pulse ensuring reactor shutdown. 
18. The reactor will be lowered and moved back into the shielded storage vault. 
19. The Z facility high bay and basement will be cleared by radiation health physics 
personnel. 
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Two methods are proposed for adding the $0.80 of reactivity prior to the pulse.  The same 
control reflector elements used to establish the delayed critical condition can be used to add the 
reactivity, or a pulse-type element that is pneumatically driven can be employed.  Either method 
would be acceptable and would work satisfactorily for this application.  Using a pulse element 
would require additional procedural steps to ensure the reactivity worth prior to insertion.  The 
following limits have been analyzed in the previous section assuming the control elements are 
used to add the reactivity. 
• Reactivity limit $0.80 to $0.90 depending on desired multiplication and pulse width 
• Control element ramp reactivity addition limit = $0.05/s 
• Rod block period = 0.5 s (limits reactivity addition to $0.86) 
• Period SCRAM = 0.3 s 
• Delay time limit (time between SCRAM initiation and start of element drop) < 0.5 s  
• Time-out interval < 5 s 
• Power level SCRAM < 1 MW 
These parameters are the proposed values that would allow for the ZEDNA reactor to operate in 
a safe and reliable manner.  A documented safety analysis (DSA) would be used to further 
investigate the operational control and limits of the system. 
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4 MITL Design 
The ZEDNA interface options with the Z machine were presented in detail in the previous 
ZEDNA report (Parma, et al., 2007).  Two of the key elements of the interface design are the 
MITL and debris shield.  The MITL, debris shield, and source configuration must be designed to 
allow for close proximity of the source with the ZEDNA to allow for the greatest effectiveness of 
the source neutrons with minimal risk of energetic debris impinging on the reactor.  The MITL 
efficiency, in terms of current-to-source transmission, must be evaluated to ensure that a 
contorted MITL is acceptable with minimal technical risk.  This section summarizes the 
continued work performed in this area during the past year.  
Understanding the mechanics of how the offset-extended MITL fails and breaks apart following 
the power generating pulse in a full scale ZR shot scenario is an important issue for ZEDNA.  
Containing, collecting, and safely removing the resulting dust, debris, and shrapnel are important 
steps that must be proceduralized, among many others, in order to have a successful and 
smoothly operating test facility.  Beryllium handling and neutron activation of materials within 
the vacuum stack are also important considerations in the facility.   
In this section the model of the current and the dynamic pressure pulse along the offset MITL is 
presented.  The results can be used as inputs to other models, such as CTH and ALEGRA, that 
will aid in characterizing the debris shield and containment wall impacts.  The primary software 
tool used in this analysis is the Micro-Cap network solving code applied innovatively to 
represent different configurations and different degrees of resolution.  The following discussion 
uses the ZR Z-pinch expected nominal parameters which are 26 MA, 6 MV, and 100 ns.  The 
current trapped in the vacuum section and the associated pressure pulse are assumed to gradually 
decay over tens of microseconds.  This modeling approach was also employed to support the 
ZIPS Task 3.4 of the LDRD Grand Challenge, in the design of a demonstration containment 
vessel. 
4.1 Current and Magnetic Impulse Modeling Assumptions 
1.  The ZR pulsed power driver model is similar technology as the Z oil/water configuration.  
The Z machine is currently undergoing a refurbishment upgrade (ZR).  It is expected that 
existing models used for the Z machine will remain valid for the ZR. 
2.  The MITL consists of perfectly aligned concentric cylinders with no less than a 3-mm 
operating gap between them.  This avoids non-uniform currents around the MITL. 
3.  A 6-MV rated vacuum insulator stack (VIS) separates the water dielectric feed lines from the 
vacuum power flow inside the MITLs. 
4.  After the Z-pinch event, the VIS flashes over, undamaged, on the vacuum side, effectively 
trapping residual energy in the MITL sections.  This effect is routine for Z operations. 
5.  Magnetic forces on larger diameter coaxial MITLs can be estimated by using the parallel 
strip-line formula: 
 F(b) = [b/2] [µo/4.448] [I(b)/b]2   - total repulsive force per length on plates (lbf/m), 
 
 P(b) = F(b) [0.0254]2 / b  - pressure on parallel plates in (psi), 
 
where 
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 b = strip-line width (i.e. coax circumference) (m), 
 
 I(b) = load current for the MITL associated with b (amps). 
 
6.  A coaxial correction is needed for the parallel formula when it is no longer true that the radius 
is much greater than the gap. 
7.  The pressure is uniform over the full length of a cylinder.  This is not true for conical MITL 
geometry, which can approximated with a series of cylinders. 
Note that, other than for a time-varying inductance, Z-pinch physics is not included in the circuit 
model load.  Also, relying heavily on the waveform data after the time of peak current is not 
desired, because the timing spread of the VIS flash-over can result in quite large variations in 
trapped energy. 
4.2 Optional MITL Configurations 
A number of configurations have been considered in trade-off studies for the purpose of 
offsetting the Z-pinch load to a source location where it can most effectively generate neutrons in 
close proximity to the ZEDNA with minimal losses.  Two options will be presented that 
represent the most feasible configurations; an inverted post-hole convolute option and an 
extended coaxial offset MITL extension option. 
A vertical cut-away perspective of the Z machine center vacuum section in Figure 4-1 illustrates 
the re-entrant chamber concept for positioning ZEDNA close to the source but without having to 
be inside the evacuated region of the stack.  The ZEDNA would be raised and lowered within its 
own containment/confinement barrier (not shown) and be capable of being moved into a storage 
vault during non operational periods.  This sequencing and experiment package interfacing was 
described in detail in the previous report (Parma, et al., 2007). 
Figure 4-2 is an enlarged view of the Z-pinch/reactor interface that shows how the fusion target 
is placed near a debris shield container by inverting the center-most section of the four ZR 
conical MITLs and converging them onto the vacuum post-hole convolute (PHC), which has also 
been lowered from its normal position.  The reactor is as close as possible to the neutron source 
in order to capture the maximum number of neutrons for multiplication.  Replacing the center set 
of conical MITLs with an inverted assembly does not appreciably affect the total inductance of 
the system.  However, any coaxial extension for the wire array offset does add inductance which 
would degrade the overall performance. 
The extended coaxial option is shown in Figure 4-3.  This configuration maintains the conical 
MITL and PHC in their original orientation but uses a longer, more inductive coaxial offset 
MITL.  The advantages of this case include less complexity and cost and easier alignment.  The 
reduced current may be more than compensated by a potentially closer proximity of the source 
within the reactor cavity, thus increasing the overall performance.  In this configuration, the four 
parallel inverted conical MITLs shown in Figure 4-2 have been replaced by the single coaxial 
MITL which also adds inductance.  A compromise between the two configurations would be to 
shorten the longer coaxial extension from 80 cm to about 56 cm where the fusion target is just 
above the debris shield as in Figure 4-2. 
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Figure 4-1.  Vacuum Center Section Showing the Inverted PHC/MITL and Re-entrant Air 
Chamber for Loading the ZEDNA From Below. 
 
 
Figure 4-2.  Expanded View of Source Region Showing the Inverted MITL Interface. 
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Figure 4-3.  Extended Coaxial MITL From Within the Post Hole Convolute Ring With the 
ZR Conical MITLs in the Standard Configuration. 
The sensitivity of the load current on inductance near the load is plotted in Figure 4-4.  For 
typical ZR parameters, the peak current has a nearly linear dependence on the load inductance 
over a 10-nH range resulting in a 20% reduction in peak current.  This corresponds to an average 
sensitivity of 0.5 MA/nH loss.  The estimated inductance is shown in Table 4-1.  There exists 5 
to 6 nH of additional inductance in the normal center/extended coaxial case as compared to the 
inverted MITL.  The Table 4-1 values in parentheses represent the shorter 56 cm extension.  In 
both cases the nominal vacuum gap in the conical MITLs is assumed to be about 1 cm.  The 
vacuum gap along the ~18-cm outer diameter coaxial extension is assumed at 0.5 cm.  The 
reduction of current may be acceptable for demonstration purposes due to the potential 
significant cost savings for the simpler coaxial configuration. 
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Figure 4-4.  Relative Peak Z-Pinch Current as a Function of Inductance. 
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Table 4-1.  Conical MITL and Extended Coaxial MITL System Inductance. 
 Normal Center Inverted Center Δ 
Center Section  (nH)   0.7   0.6 0.1 
Extended MITL (nH)   7.3 (5.1)   1.8 5.5 (3.3) 
System Total    (nH)   8.0 (5.8)   2.4 5.6 (3.4) 
 
The center section inductance outside of the PHC is small because it is farther off axis and there 
are four MITLs in parallel, thus reducing the total effective value for the inductance.   
4.3 Current and Efficiency Model for ZR 
The assumptions and current/pressure relationships of section 4.1 remain valid for this 
discussion.  The primary differences between the current ZR MITL and that for a future fusion 
power plant are that the inner offset portion of the MITL, or Recyclable Transmission Line 
(RTL), is mostly coaxial for ZR instead of conical for the power plant scale, and it is one-quarter 
or less of the total length.  Some flaring to a slightly larger diameter below the PHC should help 
stiffen the extension and reduce its inductance.  Likewise, rounding or tapering at the bottom 
would be appropriate to more smoothly match the load geometry.  These model results are based 
on a coaxial MITL effective operating gap of 4 mm, which is probably the smallest reasonable 
value based upon some Z-machine experience. 
The same Micro-Cap circuit model configuration used to represent the Z machine was used with 
the modified ZR component parameters.  The separate reference and test models are shown in 
Figure 4-5.  The primary power is provided by the Marx generator models on the left side of the 
circuit, and the load representing the Z-pinch wire array is on the right.  The lower test model is 
the same as the upper reference model, but with the addition of one transmission line model 
(Xmitl) that has the impedance and one-way propagation time for the offset extension RTL.  It is 
a straight forward calculation to vary parameters for the different coaxial dimensions considered 
in this analysis. 
Results of the analysis are shown in Figures 4-6 to 4-10.  The time scale for plots is 50 
ns/division.  The estimated magnetic pressure pulses will follow the same shape as the current 
waveforms, with a fast rise of about 100 ns and a slower fall off for many microseconds.  
Although this time period is short with respect to mechanical response times, we can probably 
assume that even short pressure impulses above some threshold value (e.g. 30 ksi yield strength 
for stainless steel) will lead to the violent disruption of the MITLs. 
A 20-cm (or 0.67-ns) long coaxial RTL is about the shortest extension for any of the ZR 
experiments.  The current and pressure waveform results are shown in Figure 4-6 for this 
reference case with an outer diameter of 18 cm and a gap spacing of 4 mm.  The short RTL 
causes a reduction of peak current by only 3%, not including MITL corner losses, which are 
assumed to be small.  The average pressure across the whole RTL is about 184 ksi at the peak of 
~1.57 μs. 
Figure 4-7 shows the effect of lengthening the extended coaxial RTL to 80 cm (or 2.67 ns).  The 
extension reduces the peak current by about 11% from the reference case.  The average pressure 
waveform peaks at about 155 ksi due to the lower current value.    
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Ref.
Model
Test
Model
 
Figure 4-5.  ZR Micro-Cap Dual Circuit Model for Coaxial Extended RTL Comparisons. 
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ZMITL = 2.03 Ω
Inominalx6 = 25.5 MA
Iextensionx6
= 24.8 MA (97.3%)
Pmag/10 = 184,000 psi
HWHM ~ 50 ns
 
Figure 4-6.  Current and Pressure for a 20-cm Long Extended Coaxial RTL. 
 
 
Inominalx6 = 25.6 MA
Iextensionx6
= 22.8 MA (89.2%)
Pmag/10 = 155,000 psi
ZMITL = 2.03 Ω
 
Figure 4-7.  Current and Pressure for a 80-cm Long Extended Coaxial RTL. 
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The results for the compromise MITL length of 56 cm are shown in Figure 4-8.  The nominal 
peak current is reduced by about 7.5% and the pressure waveform peaks at around 166 ksi. 
A sensitivity analysis was performed to determine the effect in varying only the outer diameter 
of the MITL.  Figure 4-9 shows the results for a 1 m extended coaxial MITL with a 4 mm gap 
spacing for the cases of an 18 cm and 44 cm outer diameter.  The vertical scale is 30 ksi per 
division. 
A large range of the magnetic peak pressures from ~145 ksi to ~28 ksi, respectively, are the 
result of the rapidly increasing surface area.   
 
Inominalx6 = 25.6 MA
Iextensionx6
= 23.6 MA (92.5%)
Pmag/10 = 166,000 psi
ZMITL = 2.03 Ω
 
Figure 4-8.  Current and Pressure for a 56-cm Long Extended Coaxial RTL. 
 
As shown in Figure 4-10 the fractional electrical energy stored in each component varies with 
time and other component parameters.  The vertical scale is 1 MJ per division.  For the smaller 
diameter RTL, at the time of peak load current, there are almost equal amounts of electrical 
energy in the Z-pinch load and the RTL.  When the RTL diameter is increased and the 
impedance reduced, more energy is proportionately stored in the load than in the RTL.  This 
condition is desirable because the load performance is optimized, and the lower pressures in the 
RTL results in less shrapnel, debris, dust, and vapor production.  Applying trade-off studies to 
balance performance against hardware/design cost and development time can determine whether 
it is realistic or necessary to optimize the current and energy delivered to the load.   
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9-cm Radius
ZMITL = 2.05 Ω
22-cm Radius
ZMITL = 0.90 Ω
Range
Of Peak
Pressures
In PSI
The Increase In Area
Appears To Decrease
The Magnetic Pressure
Faster Than The Increase
In Current Can Raise It.
 
Figure 4-9.  Pressure Range for 1-m Long by 4-mm Gap Extended Coaxial RTLs With 
Outer Diameters of 18 cm and 44 cm. 
 
Time of
Peak Current
Nominal Energy
Delivered to the
Load – No 
Extension
Energy Delivered
to Load Only –
With Extension
Energy Delivered
to Extension Only
2.89 MJ
2.08 MJ
1.42 MJ
ZMITL = 2.03 Ω
 
Figure 4-10.  Accumulative Energy for the 80-cm Long Extended RTL with 18-cm Outer 
Diameter and 4-mm Gap. 
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4.4 Application for a Typical Scenario 
An example of a possible design approach is presented assuming that a minimum peak current of 
22 MA (from a 26-MA capable ZR machine) is necessary to produce the desired kinetic, 
thermal, pressure impulse, and/or neutronic response from the Z-pinch load.  This places a limit 
on the allowable current loss and maximum inductance that can be added to the circuit by the 
RTL extension.  One method of satisfying this load current requirement with a practical design 
follows. 
RTL Design 
The design approach involves estimating the inductance that can be added to the center section 
while maintaining current at 22 MA minimum, then determining the longest RTL of a reasonable 
diameter which matches that inductance (or less).  A starting point is the plot of Figure 4-4 where 
it can be seen that the inductance associated with the relative reduced current (22 MA/26 MA = 
0.846) is approximately 7.0 nH.  Arbitrarily chosen are the typical coaxial MITL dimensions of 
18 cm outer diameter and 4 mm vacuum gap spacing.  Smaller diameters or larger gaps would 
increase the inductance penalty, and larger diameters would complicate the connection hardware.  
Now the vacuum impedance, Zo, and the MITL operating impedance, Zmitl, can be determined.  
The latter is based on a gap that is 75–80% of the vacuum gap (~3 mm) due to the presence of 
the electron sheath flowing along the cathode surface.  This was determined for ZR parameters 
and similar geometries in a separate effort as 
Zo = 60 ln(18/17.2) = 2.73 Ω  
Zmitl ~ 60 ln(18/17.4) = 2.03 Ω. 
Using a basic transmission line relationship, the one-way propagation time through the RTL can 
be calculated from the ratio of the inductance to the operating impedance as 
τ = Lmax / Zmitl = 7.0 nH / 2.03 Ω = 3.45 ns. 
Since the electromagnetic wave can travel at approximately 30 cm/ns in a vacuum, the maximum 
length that this coaxial RTL could be is 103.4 cm.  Now a decision can be made regarding the 
acceptable size and proximity of a reactor or the containment vessel to be tested.  Using this RTL 
length in the configuration of Figure 4-3 would limit the vessel radius to around 50 cm or less, 
due to the shape and angle of the outer MITL section.  Alternatively, the inverted center section 
MITLs of Figure 4-2 provide an additional offset of about 66 cm, so a test chamber radius of 
around 1 m would be possible.  The power-flow performance and circuit model simulation will 
not differ significantly for either case, unless the MITL corner losses, assumed to be small, are 
deemed important and need to be included in the inverted case. 
Impact on ZR Efficiency 
The values for Zmitl = 2.03 Ω and τ = 3.45 ns were entered as transmission line model 
parameters in the Micro-Cap circuit schematic shown in Figure 4-5.  The component 
representing the coaxial RTL is located near the bottom right corner of the layout and is labeled 
“Xmitl.”  The results of this simulation are shown in the Figure 4-11.  The peak load current is 
22.1 MA and the corresponding peak magnetic pressure in the RTL is 146 kpsi.  These values 
could decrease slightly when MITL corner losses are properly included in the analysis.  The 
additional loss can be compensated for by lowering the RTL inductance, which implies reducing 
the extended length or increasing the diameter. 
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Inominalx6 = 25.7 MA
Iextensionx6
= 22.1 MA (86.0%)
Pmag/10 = 146,000 psi
ZMITL = 2.05 Ω
 
Figure 4-11.  Peak current and pressure results for the 103-cm long by 18-cm OD by 4-mm 
gap extended coaxial RTL. 
 
Another effect on the pulsed power driver from the added inductance is an increase in voltage 
across the vacuum insulator stack (VIS).  This particular set of parameters results in a 7% 
increase in the VIS voltage peak from about 5.56 to 5.94 MV, according to the modeling results 
shown in Figure 4-12.  The ZR stack design should have enough safety margin to accommodate 
this added voltage change, but a vacuum side, non-surface flashover would serve to further 
protect the stack.  The primary goal would always be to design for the least inductance in the 
load area, both to maximize the energy to the load and to protect the machine hardware. 
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7% Increase In Voltage
Due To Extra 7 nH
 
Figure 4-12.  VIS voltage waveform results for the 1-m long by 18-cm OD by 4-mm gap 
extended coaxial RTL.  The horizontal scale is 40 ns per division. 
 
4.5 Summary of MITL Design 
The additional work presented is complementary to that presented in the previous ZEDNA report 
(Parma, et al., 2007).  Two design options have been developed that could work with the 
ZEDNA, an inverted post-hole convolute option and an extended coaxial offset MITL extension 
option.  Both options are technically feasible and allow for optimization from a neutron 
production level, source to ZEDNA proximity, shrapnel and debris production, cost, 
manufacturability, and replacement.  Further work would include fabrication and testing of the 
options in the ZR machine to determine source effectiveness, optimization, and determine other 
design, fabrication, maintenance, and operational issues.  
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5 Overpower and Reactivity Initiated Accident Analysis 
A documented safety analysis would be developed to analyze potential off-normal events and 
hypothetical accidents involving the ZEDNA reactor operating at the Z facility.  Hazard tables 
would be constructed that would investigate qualitatively, every possible initiating event in 
accordance with DOE-STD-3009.  For FBR systems, the most important accidents are those that 
could end up disrupting the core with the potential release of fission products to the environment.  
These accidents are always hypothetical-type events driven by either overpower conditions or are 
reactivity initiated.   
This report will investigate a few of the major hypothetical accidents postulated for ZEDNA.  
Since ZEDNA uses U-10Mo plate-type fuel and reflector elements similar to the SPR-III, the 
inherent reactivity feedback mechanisms are similar to SPR-III.  SPR-III does not maintain a fuel 
temperature feedback due to Doppler broadening of the neutron cross sections, but it does 
maintain a significant temperature feedback effect due to expansion of the core that increased the 
neutron leakage.  This is the inherent shutdown mechanism that allows the SPR-III to pulse.  
ZEDNA will have a Doppler broadening effect, due to the large amount of U-238 present, and a 
leakage effect due to geometric changes due to temperature.  The reactivity feedback will not be 
as large as for SPR-III due to the larger size and the fully reflected geometry.  Although the 
negative shutdown characteristic of the core are not required for normal operations of the 
ZEDNA, the reactivity feedback effects will play a large role in the inherent shutdown 
characteristics in the event of an overpower or reactivity driven accident.      
5.1 Modeling Technique 
A dynamic reactor modeling code was developed to simulate the pulse operation of SPR-III and 
the ZEDNA (Suo-Anttila, 2007).  SPR-III was modeled first to determine if the computational 
technique could be validated using experimental results from SPR-III shots.  Once the code was 
validated using SPR-III, it was then applied to the ZEDNA system.  The code solves the point 
reactor kinetics equations with a one-dimensional thermo-mechanical model developed by 
Reuscher (1969, 1972).  The feedback terms are incorporated in the code as lookup tables 
constructed using MCNP (2003).  The SPR-III and ZEDNA reactors were modeled in detail 
using MCNP.  Reactivity changes were calculated as the temperature or geometry of the reactor 
was differentially modified.  This technique allows the reactor pulse to be simulated using only 
first principle modeling and with no additional assumptions.  The results of the code are power 
profiles, temperature profiles, and radial and tangential stresses as functions of time. 
The major design differences between SPR-III and ZEDNA consist of the fuel enrichment and 
geometrical differences.  ZEDNA maintains fuel plates with similar dimensions and U-10Mo 
fuel enriched to 20% U-235.  The ZEDNA is significantly larger than SPR-III, with a height of 
62 cm, a diameter of 30.5 cm, and a cavity diameter of 20 cm.  ZEDNA also maintains a two 
radial region core with a 1-cm gap between the inner and outer fuel plates.  There also exist some 
neutronic differences between the SPR-III and ZEDNA.  The neutron lifetime for ZEDNA is 73 
ns, the delayed neutron fraction is 0.0073, and a Doppler temperature coefficient exists as 
compared to SPR-III.   
An MCNP model of ZEDNA was constructed and variations on fuel temperature, outer radius, 
inner radius, axial expansion, and inner movable core position, were studied to determine 
changes in reactivity.  Significant neutron histories were run to ensure precision of results.  
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Tables 5-1 to 5-5 show the results of the analysis for the fuel temperature feedback, outer radial 
expansion, inner radial contraction, axial expansion, and inner movable core position, 
respectively.  This tabular data was then used as lookup tables in the dynamic modeling code to 
determine the reactivity feedback as a function of the fission heating in the core.  Linear 
interpolation was used in the tabular data to generate a continuous feedback effect.  
Table 5-1.  ZEDNA Doppler Feedback Coefficient as a Function of Temperature. 
 
Fuel Temperature  
(K) 
Reactivity         
Change ($)          
from reference 
293 (reference) 0.000 
400 -0.064 
500 -0.078 
600 -0.078 
1200 -0.082 
 
Table 5-2.  ZEDNA Leakage Feedback as a Function of Outer Radial Expansion. 
 
Outer Radial 
Expansion (mm) 
Reactivity          
Change ($)          
from reference 
0.0 (reference) 0.000 
0.1 -0.004 
0.2 -0.023 
0.3 -0.035 
0.4 -0.049 
0.6 -0.072 
0.8 -0.109 
 
Table 5-3.  ZEDNA Leakage Feedback as a Function of Inner Radial Contraction. 
 
Inner Radial 
Contraction (mm) 
Reactivity          
Change ($)          
from reference 
0.0 (reference) 0.000 
-0.1 +0.002 
-0.2 +0.019 
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Table 5-4.  ZEDNA Leakage Feedback as a Function of Axial Expansion. 
 
Axial Expansion 
(mm) 
Reactivity          
Change ($)          
from reference 
0.0 (reference) 0.000 
0.1 -0.0015 
0.2 -0.023 
0.3 -0.040 
0.4 -0.049 
0.5 -0.068 
0.6 -0.076 
0.7 -0.095 
0.8 -0.122 
 
Table 5-5.  ZEDNA Reactivity Change as a Function of Inner Core Position. 
 
Axial Position (cm) 
Reactivity          
Change ($)          
from reference 
0.0 (reference) 0.000 
0.5 -0.157 
1.0 -0.214 
1.5 -0.285 
2.0 -0.420 
2.5 -0.505 
3.0 -0.651 
4.0 -0.912 
10.0 -2.532 
20.0 -5.266 
30.0 -7.620 
46.0 -10.91 
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5.2 Normal ZEDNA Operation 
The dynamic modeling code was run for the ZEDNA for a reactivity addition of $0.80 and 
nominal Z-pulse condition. This calculation allows for a base case for comparison of the off-
normal conditions.  The nominal condition includes enough initial D-T neutrons to ensure that 
the cavity fluence meets the requirement of 6.1 x 1014 nvt.  Figures 5-1 to 5-3 show the reactor 
power level, fuel temperature, and total energy yield as functions of time, respectively, for the 
ZEDNA for a nominal operation.  The Z pulse occurs at 0.1 ms (10-4 s).  The safety block 
(movable portion of the reactor core) drops at 50 ms (5 x 10-2 s).  The timing for the safety block 
to drop is arbitrarily chosen for the analysis.   For a large pulse on the SPR-III reactor, the safety 
block is actually pushed by the axial expansion of the fuel which, at the same time breaks the 
electromagnetic coupling.  The safety block begins to move immediately with acceleration 
greater than that of gravity, due the force applied by the axial expansion.  For ZEDNA, the 
electromagnetic field can be adjusted to ensure a timely release of the safety block.  However, 
for all of the analyses presented, the safety block is assumed to be released by gravity at 50 ms. 
The initial spike in the power level (Figure 5-1) is due to the initial pulse neutrons causing 
fission.  The initial neutrons are multiplied (prompt multiplication) over the next ~200 μs.  Over 
this time period, the neutron population decreases by five orders of magnitude.  This is the 
portion of the power curve that is desirable for the experimenter.  After this period, delayed 
neutrons drive the system with inherent negative reactivity feedback from the energy deposition 
in the pulse.  A large negative reactivity addition occurs at 55 ms when the safety block falls 
from the core adding ~$10 of negative reactivity in ~0.2 seconds.  The tail portion of the curve 
(after ~0.3 s) is the continued decrease in power from the delayed neutron contribution.  
Additional negative reactivity would be added at less than 0.5 seconds with the reactor SCRAM 
initiation and dropping of the control reflector elements.  This effect is not included in the 
analysis.  With significant negative reactivity added to the system, the reactor power would 
continue to decrease with a period of ~80 seconds due to the decay of the most persistent delayed 
neutron group. 
The average and peak temperature rise in the reactor fuel (Figure 5-2) is not significant for a 
nominal pulse condition.  The peak temperature rise is only ~110°C immediately after the pulse 
and ~140°C with the additional energy included in the tail following the pulse.  The average 
temperature rise is ~70°C immediately after the pulse and ~100°C with the additional energy 
included in the tail following the pulse.  Compare this with the SPR-III reactor that increases in 
temperature by a few hundred degrees after a shot.  The energy deposited in the ZEDNA 
following a nominal shot is ~30 MJ compared to ~10 MJ for SPR-III, but ZEDNA has a fuel 
mass of ~1900 kg, compared to SPR-III with a mass of ~250 kg, a factor of 7.6 times the heat 
capacity.  The temperature is shown in Figure 5-2 to decrease at 250 seconds due to a convective 
cooling boundary condition included in the analysis. 
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Figure 5-1.  Reactor Power as a Function of Time for the Nominal Operating Condition. 
 
 
Figure 5-2.  Fuel Temperature as a Function of Time for the Nominal Operating Condition. 
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The energy yield (total fission energy deposited in the fuel) is shown in Figure 5-3 for four 
different reactivity feedback conditions:  1) with Doppler and expansion (nominal condition); 2) 
Doppler only; 3) expansion only; and 4) no feedback.  The energy scale in Figure 5-3 is from 20 
to 35 MJ and the time scale is in milliseconds.  The black curve shows the energy yield in the 
case of no reactivity feedback, except for the safety block drop at 50 ms.  Without feedback the 
neutron pulse is multiplied yielding approximately 25 MJ of energy.  If only Doppler feedback is 
included the energy yield is reduced to approximately 22 MJ.  If only expansion feedback is 
included, there is an increase in initial energy yield because the inner radius expands before the 
outer radius. And finally, when all feedback effects are included, the net pulse yield is 22.5 MJ, 
which is a loss of 2.5 MJ (10%) compared to the case of no feedback. 
 
Figure 5-3.  Energy Yield as a Function of Time for the Nominal Operating Condition. 
 
5.3 Off-Normal ZEDNA Cases 
Three off-normal initiating events or hypothetical accidents are presented that are thought to 
bound the possible overpower and reactivity driven accident possibilities.  The first event 
assumes that reactivity is added at a ramp rate of $0.25/s and that reactivity of greater than $1.00 
is added, followed immediately by a Z pulse.  The second event assumes that the Z pinch 
produced a neutron pulse four times greater than a nominal neutron pulse.  The third event 
assumes reactivity greater than $1.00 is added and that the safety block fails to fall away from 
the core and the control reflector elements fail to fall. 
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Case 1:  Reactivity Greater Than $1.00 Followed by a Z Pulse 
The first off normal event consists of too much initial reactivity, which causes a ZEDNA pulse 
similar to a SPR pulse. Using the control elements or a pulse element to add the reactivity, it 
would be highly unlikely that this accident could ever occur.  For control element insertion, the 
initiating event would be that the control element was withdrawing uncontrollably, or that the 
operator was inadvertently moving the control element.  For control element insertion, the rod 
block and period SCRAM would also have to fail to function properly.  For pulse element 
insertion, the initiating event would be an inaccurate calibration of the pulse element, or a 
reactivity change in the pulse element prior to insertion. 
The calculation consists of reactivity addition of $1.05 (arbitrarily chosen) at $0.25/s followed by 
the Z pulse 20 ms later, followed by safety block release 50 ms later.  Figures 5-4 to 5-7 show 
the reactor power level for a logarithmic and linear time scale, fuel temperature, and reactivity as 
functions of time, respectively, for this ZEDNA accident.  The first reactor pulse occurs at ~0.23 
s because the reactivity has exceeded one dollar.  The inherent Doppler and expansion reactivity 
feedback are all that exist to shut the reactor power down at this point.  If there were no negative 
feedback, the reactor power would continue to rise until enough expansion occurred or the 
reactor disassembled itself.  Since $1.05 was added, only $0.05 of negative reactivity is required 
to terminate the pulse because the reactor is being driven by prompt neutrons.  Note from Table 
5-1, that negative $0.06 of reactivity can be added by Doppler for a temperature rise of ~100°C.  
The second pulse occurs because control hardware was assumed to be unable to stop the Z 
machine from initiating a pulse.  This double pulse causes the maximum energy yield 
conceivable for this type of accident. 
The time scale in Figure 5-4 goes out approximately 15 minutes to give the reader an idea of the 
full power history.  The pulse detail is shown in the Figure 5-5 which is plotted on a linear time 
scale. The plateau that follows the second pulse is similar to that seen for the nominal case; it is 
due to multiplication of delayed neutrons.  The drop in power after the plateau is due to the 
safety block drop. The reactor power continues to decrease after this time with a period of ~80 
seconds due to the decay of the most persistent delayed neutron group. 
The slight rise in power before the safety block drop is a numerical artifact caused by releasing 
the fixed axial boundary condition at the core mid plane.  When the fixed displacement boundary 
condition is released, the core relaxes, but in the direction of adding reactivity.  Thus the two 
core halves move toward each other at a rate faster than the falling velocity.  In reality this effect 
cannot happen since the two core halves actually push against one another.  The slight error 
introduced by this effect is negligible in terms of the overall modeling behavior, but it appears in 
some cases when a safety block drop occurs. 
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Figure 5-4.  Reactor Power as a Function of Time for the $1.05 Addition Followed by a Z 
Pulse and Safety Block Drop. 
 
Figure 5-5.  Detailed Reactor Power as a Function of Time for the $1.05 Addition Followed 
by a Z Pulse and Safety Block Drop. 
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Figure 5-6 shows the average and peak temperature rise in the fuel as a function of time.  The 
peak temperature rise is less than 350°C immediately following the pulse.  The average 
temperature rise is less than 250°C immediately following the pulse.  These temperatures are 
about the same as that for a nominal SPR-III pulse.  The amount of energy deposited in the 
ZEDNA fuel for this accident condition is about three times that of a nominal ZEDNA pulse 
condition (~70 MJ compared to ~22 MJ).  Hence this type of off-normal double pulse event 
would not jeopardize the integrity of the ZEDNA reactor fuel. Fuel cracking could occur if the 
fuel plates were not properly segmented, but release of fission products would not be expected 
since the fuel melt temperature of 1130°C is not approached. 
 
Figure 5-6.  Fuel Temperature as a Function of Time for the $1.05 Addition Followed by a 
Z Pulse and Safety Block Drop. 
The reactivity associated with this accident is shown in Figure 5-7.  The initial positive slope is 
due to the $0.25/s reactivity ramp addition.  The drop at 0.23 s is due to the first pulse that adds 
enough negative reactivity to lower the value to below $1.00.  The next drop at ~0.25 s is due to 
the Z pulse and subsequent prompt neutron multiplication, which adds most of the energy yield 
and causes a significant drop in reactivity – to approximately $0.70 positive. The final drop in 
reactivity at 0.3 s is due to safety block drop. 
Note that although there was a $1.05 reactivity limit in the initial reactivity addition, larger 
additions could be tolerated without risk to the reactor.  Other cases with higher reactivity limits 
would have similar behavior, but with more total energy yield. 
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Figure 5-7.  Reactivity as a Function of Time for the $1.05 Addition Followed by a Z Pulse 
and Safety Block Drop. 
 
Case 2:  Z Pulse - Four Times Nominal 
This off-normal ZEDNA event assumes the nominal conditions, but that the Z pulse is larger by 
a factor of four.  The factor of four was arbitrarily chosen.  The increase could only be due to an 
unexpected increase in the Z machine or source output.  How this could happen is unknown and 
is therefore highly hypothetical.  It would be expected that once a source was used for ZEDNA it 
would be experimentally tested many times to identify the potential source variation.  Changes 
due to the interface geometry of ZEDNA with the source could only have tens of percent 
changes in the effective source magnitude.  Also, any change in the geometry of the source or the 
proximity to ZEDNA would be expected to result in a decrease in the source magnitude. 
The calculation is the same as for the nominal condition, but the initial source for the analysis 
was multiplied by four.  Figure 5-8 to 5-10 show the reactor power level, fuel temperature, and 
energy yield as functions of time, respectively, for this ZEDNA accident.  The resulting power 
profile shown in Figure 5-8 is very similar to Figure 5-1 for the nominal case, as expected.   
Figure 5-9 shows the average and peak temperature rise in the fuel as functions of time.  The 
peak temperature rise is ~350°C immediately following the pulse.  The average temperature rise 
is less than ~250°C.  These temperatures are about the same result as found for the previous 
accident.  The energy yield, shown in Figure 5-10, is ~75 MJ immediately after the pulse, and 
~87 MJ at ~300 s.  This result is about four times the nominal energy yield and is expected since 
the yield should be directly proportional to the external source magnitude. 
(s)   
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Figure 5-8.  Reactor Power as a Function of Time for the Nominal Z Pulse Increased by a 
Factor of Four and Safety Block Drop. 
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Figure 5-9.  Fuel Temperature as a Function of Time for the Nominal Z Pulse Increased by 
a Factor of Four and Safety Block Drop. 
 
Figure 5-10.  Energy Yield as a Function of Time for the Nominal Z Pulse Increased by a 
Factor of Four and Safety Block Drop. 
These results indicate that this type of off-normal event would not jeopardize the integrity of the 
ZEDNA reactor fuel. Fuel cracking could occur if the fuel plates were not properly segmented, 
but release of fission products would not be expected since the fuel melt temperature of 1130°C 
is not approached. 
 
Case 3:  Reactivity Greater Than $1.00 Without Shutdown 
The most severe hypothetical accident that can be envisioned is that in the event of a nominal 
pulse or an accident where greater than $1.00 of reactivity was added, the safety block and 
control elements fail to fall from the core.  This event is hypothetical for three reasons:  1) in the 
event of a large pulse, the safety block will be pushed away from the core and break the 
electromagnetic coupling, and 2) a SCRAM signal will be initiated automatically following a 
pulse, de-energizing the power to the electromagnets to the safety block and the control reflector 
elements, and 3) the operators are trained to manually SCRAM the reactor immediately 
following a pulse if a SCRAM is not automatically initiated.  Hence at least two failures would 
be required for this event to occur.  The SCRAM system must fail and the safety block must be 
jammed and unable to separate from the upper core.  However, for the purpose of safety analysis, 
this worst possible condition was analyzed.  For this analysis the control reflector elements are 
assumed to add reactivity at the rate of $0.25/s and a maximum reactivity of $1.05 (arbitrarily 
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chosen) is added.  These same “shutdown restricted” conditions for the nominal pulse case 
would be a less severe accident and would be bounded by this analysis. 
This accident condition would severely degrade the core because, although some negative 
reactivity is added immediately following the pulse, the reactor remains in a supercritical 
condition and significantly more negative reactivity is required.  From Table 5-1, the Doppler 
reactivity feedback is not significant after the initial 100°C temperature rise.  The core must 
continue to expand until either the neutron leakage is enough to drive the reactor subcritical, or 
the fuel plates begin to crack or melt and the core disassembles itself.  The dynamic code 
currently only treats expansion with elastic deformation.  Hence the analysis is performed with 
these caveats.  The resulting power, fuel temperature, energy yield, and reactivity are shown in 
Figures 5-11 to 5-14. 
The power profile is shown in Figure 5-11.  The power following the pulse decreases, due to the 
added negative reactivity, but the quantity of negative reactivity is insufficient to make the 
reactor subcritical.  The temperature profile (Figure 5-12) shows that the peak temperature would 
reach 2050°C and the average temperature 1450°C.  Since these temperatures are well beyond 
the fuel melt temperature of 1130°C, the results of the code are not valid.  A code that included 
modeling of the plastic region, and fuel cracking/melting would be required to better predict the 
core behavior at these conditions. The predictions for this code are based upon large 
extrapolations of material properties, which have only been measured up to 600°C. 
The energy yield (Figure 5-13) shows that at the end of 40 s, ~380 MJ of energy is deposited in 
the core.  The reactivity (Figure 5-14) is less than zero at approximately 6 seconds into the 
transient.  At 6 s, the peak fuel temperature has exceeded the melt point, but the average fuel 
temperature is still well below the melt point.  However, sufficient power decay remains in the 
core to cause significant additional heating and potential melting of at least a portion of the core.  
Again this accident is highly hypothetical.  Although more advanced modeling must be 
developed to determine the actual transient behavior of the core, the results allow an estimate of 
the total energy yield to be determined.  Approximately 380 MJ of energy would be deposited in 
the fuel.  A portion of the core would potentially melt, allowing some fraction of the fission 
products, especially the gases and volitiles, to escape into the containment vessel and possibly 
from the building through the ventilation system. 
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Figure 5-11.  Reactor Power as a Function of Time for the $1.05 Addition Without Safety 
Block Drop or Control Element Drop. 
 
Figure 5-12.  Fuel Temperature as a Function of Time for the $1.05 Addition Without 
Safety Block Drop or Control Element Drop. 
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Figure 5-13.  Energy Yield as a Function of Time for the $1.05 Addition Without Safety 
Block Drop or Control Element Drop. 
 
Figure 5-14.  Reactivity as a Function of Time for the $1.05 Addition Without Safety Block 
Drop. 
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5.4 Summary of Off-Normal Events 
The accidents presented are hypothetical and would require several failures in order to occur.  
However the results using the dynamic modeling code show that if the safety block portion of the 
core and the control reflector element operate as designed, the integrity of the fuel plates for the 
ZEDNA is not jeopardized.  For these cases, no significant fission product release from the core 
would be expected.  The ZEDNA is designed with enough inherent negative shutdown and heat 
capacity to mitigate the conditions if too much reactivity or source neutrons were inserted into 
the core.  The condition of excessive reactivity with failure of the safety block and control 
reflector elements would cause the core to approach the melt temperature.  For this hypothetical 
case, it would be expected that significant fission product release might occur, especially if a 
portion of the core experienced melt conditions.  More advance modeling is required to treat the 
shutdown mechanisms of this hypothetical accident properly.  However, this type of accident is 
considered in calculating the potential downwind dose estimate in the next section. 
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6 Downwind Dose Estimates for ZEDNA Accidents 
The ZEDNA will not require external cooling during operations.  Nitrogen gas cooling may be 
included in the design of the reactor in a similar way that SPR-III is cooled.  SPR-III has a 
nitrogen gas cooling system to operate in the steady-state mode, and to allow for cooling when 
multiple pulses per day are required.  However the ZEDNA would not operate in a steady-state 
mode, and would probably only pulse once per day, and would therefore not necessarily require 
this type of cooling system.  Decay heat generated from the fission products is minimal for these 
types of research reactors and does not require decay heat removal, as does a power reactor.  
Fuel melting due to decay heat generated is not possible.  However, other accident conditions 
could occur that could cause sufficient heat generation to melt and vaporize some of the reactor 
fuel.  These types of accidents could include reactivity addition accidents, failure of shutdown 
accidents, or overpower accidents from too large of source neutrons produced from the Z 
machine.  Although more unlikely, a fire in the facility could also potentially, melt or cause fuel 
vaporization. 
For all of these types of accidents, a fraction of the fission products that were generated in 
previous pulse operations, or in the accident initiating pulse, could be released from the fuel melt 
and into the containment vessel.  The containment vessel could maintain its integrity and not 
allow any of the fission product to escape, or it could be breached and allow fission products to 
be released to the environment via exhaust stacks that would be required for the vacuum stack, 
basement, and high-bay area. 
The purpose of this analysis is to provide a quantitative estimate of the potential radiological 
dose that could be realized to the collocated worker and the public in the event of a catastrophic 
accident of ZEDNA at the Z-machine facility.  The results are intended to be used for scoping 
purposes.  The methodology presented is intended to be conservative and bounding.  
6.1 Site and Exclusion Boundary 
In order to determine downwind dose estimates, the site and exclusion boundaries must be 
established for the nuclear facility.  The site boundary is identified as the fenced-in area of the 
facility where a person of the general public or a collocated worker would be restricted from 
entering.  A site boundary would have both fences and security gates that would allow only 
access-personnel to the site.  There is no requirement that the dose at the site boundary be below 
a given value in the event of a catastrophic accident.  Of course, the desire is that the dose at the 
site boundary be low if a catastrophic accident did occur. 
The exclusion boundary encompasses an area significantly larger than the site boundary.  The 
exclusion boundary must be an area where the emergency management team can gain access and 
control in the event of a catastrophic accident.  This may include public and private roads and 
property.  For the SNL nuclear facilities in TA-V, the exclusion boundary is a circle 1350 m in 
radius with TA-V at the center.  This places the edge of the exclusion boundary at Pennsylvania 
Avenue near the Kirtland Air Force Base riding stables. 
TA-IV is located about 1.6 km directly south of the Steve Schiff Auditorium at SNL, 
Albuquerque.  Currently there is no official site boundary or exclusion boundary for TA-IV 
because the facilities located there are not nuclear facilities.  The current security controlled 
fence boundary of TA-IV, that includes the Z-machine facility (Building 983), is shown in 
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Figure 6-1.  This could become the site boundary if the Z facility was established as a nuclear 
facility, or a different boundary could be established if necessary to control access to the facility.  
Currently the south and southeast boundaries are 0.062 km away from the Z-machine building 
edge.  The gate to the parking lot is 0.10 km to the west.  The parking lot edge is 0.15 m west 
northwest.  The buildings to the west and northeast are experimental facilities that maintain other 
pulsed-power machines.  The closest office building is Building 980 outside the gate, 0.10 km to 
the west.  The closest permanent office buildings within the boundary are Building 970 located 
0.12 km northeast and Building 960 located 0.15 km to the northwest.  Building 962 is located 
0.3 km to the north northwest. 
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Figure 6-1.  Current Fenced Boundary at TA-IV. 
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Figure 6-2 shows the proximity of various landmarks from the Z-machine facility, Building 983.  
The numbers identified in Figure 6-2 are delineated as follows: 
1. The Steve Schiff Auditorium and Buildings 821, 822, and 823 are 1.6 km north; 
2. Building 810 is 2.1 km north north-west; 
3. The Manzano Mesa residential area is 3 km north-east; 
4. The Kirtland Air Force Base Eubank gate is 2.5 km north-east; 
5. The nearest meteorological tower is 1 km north; 
6. The Kirtland Air Force Base golf course about 1.8 km south south-east; 
7. Pennsylvania Avenue is about 0.5 km South West of the building. 
 
Base housing is greater than 2.1 km north north-west of the facility.  Downtown Albuquerque is 
about 10 km north-west of the facility. 
 
 
Figure 6-2.  Distances to Various Landmarks From the Z-Machine Facility. 
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Figure 6-3 shows TA-IV with the Z facility at the center of two concentric circles 400 m and 500 
m in radius.  The 500 m radius circle just touches Pennsylvania Avenue and includes all of the 
buildings in TA-IV.  It does not encompass any portion of TA-I, TA-II, the golf course, pole-line 
road, or other close proximity base site.  This may be a reasonable exclusion boundary that could 
be well controlled in the event of an emergency. 
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Figure 6-3.  Proposed Exclusion Boundary for TA-IV. 
 
6.2   Worker, Collocated Worker, and Member of the Public 
For the purpose of this report, a worker is defined as a person who would be located within the 
site boundary of the facility during operations.  A collocated worker is a worker who would be 
outside of the site, but permanently reside in a nearby building or high bay.  A member of the 
public would be a person who could be living nearby or have access to public and private roads 
and other facilities. 
In the event of a hypothetical catastrophic nuclear accident, it is highly desirable that workers 
and collocated workers be protected.  This protection is ensured by making every effort to have a 
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well designed and robust reactor system with inherent and automatic shutdown systems, trained 
and certified reactor operating personnel, trained workers at the facility, and a well managed 
emergency plan. 
The same holds true for members of the public, with the additional requirement that dose 
estimates be calculated for a hypothetical maximally exposed individual.  This person is a 
member of the public that receives the highest dose at or beyond the exclusion boundary during 
the passage of the airborne radioactive plume generated as a result of a hypothetical accident.  As 
the plume passes the individual, the individual could receive a radiation dose due to both 
immersion within the plume and inhalation from breathing the plume.  The total effective dose 
equivalent (TEDE) to the whole body is calculated at the location that includes the dose due to 
immersion and inhalation from the passing airborne plume of radioactive material.  In 
accordance with DOE-STD-3009-94, slow-developing dose pathways such as the ingestion of 
contaminated food, water supply contamination, or the inhalation of resuspended material are not 
included in the calculation.  Direct exposure from the radioactive plume is included, but 
radioactive material deposited on the ground causing direct exposure is not included.  The 
inhalation dose includes direct exposure from the material while in the lung as well as the 50-
year committed effective dose equivalent (CEDE) from material remaining in the lung or passing 
into the body organs. 
6.3 Evaluation Guideline 
An evaluation guideline is a TEDE value established by the DOE that is used to judge the risk 
associated with a hypothetical radiological accident.  If the calculated dose at the exclusion 
boundary approaches this value, then more engineered safety features, identified as safety-class 
structures, systems, and components (SSCs), are required in the design, or a larger exclusion 
boundary is required.  Change Notice 2 to DOE-STD-3009-94 (DOE 2002b) mandates a TEDE 
of 25 rem (0.25 Sv) at the exclusion boundary for the evaluation guideline.  This value is also 
consistent with the NRC requirement established in 10 CFR 50.67. 
6.4 Methodology 
DOE-STD-3009-94 requires that estimates of dose consequences be made for comparison with 
the evaluation guideline.  The basic analytical models use a Gaussian plume dispersion model to 
determine the downwind dose as the plume is transported from the source to the receptor.  The 
basic form of this equation for a ground release of radioactive isotope i is as follows (RG 1.145): 
( )[ ]
Q
DCCEDEBRRSTEDE iiii
Χ+=  
where 
 
TEDEi  = Total effective dose equivalent for isotope i (rem or Sv), 
 
RSi = Source term released of isotope i (Ci or Bq), 
 
BR = Average breathing rate of receptor (3 x 10-4 m3/s), 
 
CEDEi = Committed effective dose equivalent from inhalation for isotope i (rem/Ci or    Sv/Bq), 
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DCi = Dose coefficient for air submersion for isotope i (rem-m
3/Ci-s or Sv-m3/Bq-s) 
 
zyU
QoverChi
Q σσπ
1
)( =Χ  (s/m3) 
 
U = wind speed (m/s), 
 
σy = Standard deviation in the crosswind concentration as a function of the atmospheric stability 
class and downwind distance (m), 
 
σz = Standard deviation in the vertical concentration as a function of atmospheric stability class 
and downwind distance (m). 
 
The lower the wind speed, the greater the concentration of the isotope i at the receptor.  The 
value for the standard deviation is a function of the atmospheric stability class and the downwind 
distance from the source.  Directional wind data and atmospheric stability classes are used to 
determine the appropriate values for the wind speed and the standard deviations. 
A number of computer codes have been written to evaluate the downwind dose for both 
continuous releases and puff source-term releases.  For this analysis, two codes were used to 
estimate the downwind dose for a ZEDNA hypothetical accident in TA-IV.  The Melcor 
Accident Consequence Code System Version 2 (MACCS2) computer model (Chanin and Young, 
1997) was used in the form of an isotopic database as a function of downwind distance.  This 
database was developed for TA-V nuclear facilities (Naegeli, 2003) and is used exclusively for 
calculating release estimates in the nuclear facilities documented safety analysis.  The 
assumption in using this database is that the directional wind data and atmospheric stability 
classes for TA-IV are similar to TA-V.  This is believed to be true since the two areas are in 
relatively close proximity to each other. 
The other method uses the PAVAN code (Bander, 1982) and wind rose data from the 
meteorological tower near TA-IV to determine the Chi over Q (Χ/Q) dispersion coefficient 
values and the directional dependent maximum values over different time spans.  This code 
allows for the maximum dose as a function of direction and distance to be calculated using actual 
wind rose data from the site. 
The MACCS results include the dose conversion from Ci or Bq to rem or Sv.  The PAVAN code 
uses the Χ/Q values calculated with the CEDEi and DCi to determine the dose.  The values for 
the CEDEi and DCi for individual isotopes are found in the Federal Guidance Report 11 
(Eckerman, et al., 1989), and Federal Guidance Report 12 (Eckerman and Ryman, 1993), 
respectively. 
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6.5 Source Term 
For this analysis, only fission products are assumed to be released from ZEDNA in a 
hypothetical accident.  The uranium and other activated materials in the reactor will not 
contribute significantly to the overall dose estimate.  Experiments containing plutonium, tritium 
or other radioactive materials will not be considered in this analysis, although these materials 
could contribute overwhelmingly to the dose estimate.  For example, a plutonium experiment 
that was accidentally overheated could cause a large downwind dose effect.  The tritium included 
in the D-T ICF source is also not included in the analysis, but will have a small downwind dose 
effect.  In a full documented safety analysis, the downwind dose contribution from experiments 
would be required to be analyzed.  For this report, we are only concerned about the reactor 
source term, which is dominated by the fission product inventory. 
The quantity of airborne fission products that could leave the Z facility in the event of an 
accident is referred to as the source term, or release source term (RS).  This quantity is dependent 
on the specific accident in question and other factors, such as decontamination factors in the 
building ventilation. In the context of DOE-STD-3009-94, as applied to a reactor facility, the 
airborne release source term can be expressed as: 
 
RS = ∑i RSi  
 
and 
 
RSi  =  MARi  ×  DRi  ×  ARFi  ×  RFi  ×  LPFi  ×  DFi (15.2) 
 
where 
  
RS = release source term - total source term released from the facility (Ci or Bq), 
 
RSi = the source term released from the facility of isotope i (Ci or Bq), 
 
MARi = material at risk - total inventory of isotope i in the reactor that could potentially be 
released, 
 
DRi = damage ratio – the fraction of MARi that is available for release from the reactor fuel – e.g. 
the fraction of fuel melt, 
 
ARFi = airborne release fraction – the fraction of the released inventory of isotope i that is 
airborne, 
 
RFi = respirable fraction – the fraction of isotope i that is respirable, 
 
LPFi = leak path factor – the fraction of isotope i that is not plated out or retained in ventilation 
filters on the building, 
 
DFi = decay factor – the fraction of isotope i that is not decayed prior to release from the facility. 
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For purposes of this analysis, all releases will be assumed to be unmitigated.  The following 
assumptions apply: 
 
1) No credit is taken for the ventilation system, including filters or plate-out within the building 
(i.e., LPFi = 1.0). 
2) The decay, within the facility, of short-lived radionuclides generated in the accident is 
ignored (i.e., DFi =1.0).  However a 10 minute decay will be assumed in calculating the 
radioisotope inventory. 
3) The ARFi and RFi will be taken as unity (i.e., ARFi = RFi = 1.0). 
4) For fission products, DRi will be taken to mean that fraction of the radionuclide, i, inventory 
released from the parent material.  
 
In summary, for fission products, 
 
RSi = MARi × MRFi   
 
where MRFi is the fraction of the released inventory of isotope, i, that is airborne and respirable. 
 
For all accidents that involve the reactor, it was assumed that the reactor has been operating in 
the pulse mode for 30 days prior to the accident.  The reactor is assumed to have pulsed every 
day at 25 MJ per pulse.  In order to determine the fission product pre-accident inventory, a power 
level of 300 W (equivalent to 25 MJ divided by 24 hours per day and 3600 seconds per hour) 
was assumed over a 29 day period with a 24 hour decay period leading up to the accident 
condition.  The inventory for a 25 MJ pulse was also calculated with a 10 minute decay period.  
The pulse inventory was then scaled appropriately to reflect the amount of fission energy in the 
accident event.  The fission product inventory was calculated using the computer code 
ORIGEN2 (Croff 1983).  The calculated fission product inventory for the 25 MJ pulse with a 10 
minute decay and the 300 W operation for 29 days with a 24 hour decay is included in Appendix 
A.  This inventory represents the MARi values used in determining the source term, RSi.   
For sufficient fission energy release in a reactor accident, a portion of the fuel may be melted. In 
the absence of vaporization, such a melted region would be located near the center of the fuel 
mass.  For a fuel region driven into a molten state (greater than approximately 1150oC), it is 
expected that essentially all of the solid-species and non-volatile fission products would be 
retained in the melt.  Furthermore, a significant fraction of the volatile (halogens), semi-volatile 
(selenium, cesium, tellurium, ruthenium) and the noble gas (xenon, krypton) species would also 
be expected to be retained.   
Some NRC-proposed data for the release of fission products from melting (greater than 
approximately 2860oC) oxide fuel in a pressurized water reactor (PWR) is given in DOE-HDBK-
3010-94. The release fractions for noble gases and halogens are given as 0.95 and 0.22, 
respectively.  The release fraction given for semi-volatile species ranges from a high of 0.15 for 
cesium to a low of 0.002 for lanthanum.  DOE-STD-1027, Attachment 1, suggests release 
fractions of 1.0, 0.5, 0.01, and 0.001, respectively, for gases, volatiles, semi-volatiles, and all 
other materials, in establishing the hazard category level for facilities.  
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The time dependence of the release is not given in any of the references, but will vary depending 
on the diffusion time of the species in the melt.  Because the melted fuel region developed in an 
accident case is surrounded by solid material, it will solidify shortly after the accident and limit 
the diffusion of any of the fission products.  
For purposes of this accident analysis, the MRFi values suggested in DOE-STD-1027, 
Attachment 1, and shown in Table 6-1 will be used for both the MACCS and PAVAN 
calculations.  In addition an MRFi value equal to 1.0 will be used for comparative purposes in the 
MACCS analysis. 
 
Table 6-1.  Material Release Fraction Assumed for Chemical Groups. 
 
Group 
Material 
Release 
Fraction Elements 
1.  Gases 1.0 Nobles 
2.  Volatiles 0.5 Halogens 
3.  Semi-Volatiles 0.01 Se, Rb, Sn, Te, Cs 
4.  Non-Volatiles 0.001 
Ge, As, Sr, Y, Zr, 
Nb, Mo, Tc, Ru, 
Rh, Pd, Ag, Cd, In, 
Ba, La, Ce, Pr, Nd, 
Pm, Sm, Eu 
 
In the event of a hypothetical catastrophic accident, the amount of energy deposited in the fuel is 
directly proportional to the fission product inventory in the pulse.  The amount of energy 
deposited must be estimated in order to determine the potential source term.  It could be 
envisioned that for some reactivity driven accidents, the fuel melting would be the ultimate 
shutdown mechanism.  Even for these conditions, melting the complete core would not be very 
likely.  Instead, melting in the peak flux regions would be more expected.  Table 6-2 shows the 
energy requirements for various conditions for the full ZEDNA core, with a mass of 1950 kg.  
The total enthalpy required to reach melt (1130°C), go through melt (heat of fusion), to 
vaporization, and through vaporization (heat of vaporization) are shown.  The scaling factor 
compared to a 25 MJ nominal pulse is also shown.  In order to reach the melting point for the 
complete ZEDNA core, about 15 times the nominal 25 MJ pulse would be required. 
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Table 6-2.  Enthalpy Required to Melt and Vaporize ZEDNA. 
Condition 
 
 
 
Enthalpy (J/g) 
Energy Required 
for ZEDNA 
(1951 kg) 
(MJ) 
Multiple of 
Nominal 25 MJ 
Pulse 
1.  to melt (1130°C) 200.9 392.0 15 
2.  through melt 259.5 506.3 20 
3.  to vaporization 694.9 1355.7 54 
4.  through      
     vaporization 
2570.2 5014.3 200 
 
For this analysis, it will be assumed that a hypothetical, worst-case accident could include a 
pulse with an energy deposition 15 times the nominal 25 MJ operation.  This is consistent with 
the accident scenario results presented in Chapter 5.  This result is believed to be a bounding 
condition for the ZEDNA. 
6.6 Downwind Dose Results Summary 
The downwind dose results are presented for the MACCS database and the PAVAN calculations.  
The MACCS results are calculated using the source term inventory included in Appendix A with 
the release fractions and MACCS database dose conversion factors included in Appendix B.  The 
PAVEN results are calculated using the same source term inventory included in Appendix A, the 
Χ/Q values calculated using PAVAN in Appendix C, and the CEDEi and DCi values from the 
Federal Guidance Reports 11 and 12. 
The MACCS results are shown in Table 6-3 using the material release fractions in Table 6-1, and 
Table 6-4 using a material release fraction of one.  Results were analyzed for downwind 
distances of 0.35 to 0.55 km, 0.95 to 1.05 km, and 1.30 to 1.40 km.  The results show that using 
the release fractions from Table 6-1, the downwind dose for a 15 times nominal pulse inventory 
is 0.82 rem at the proposed exclusion boundary of 500 m.  The dose decreases by more than a 
factor of 2.5 at 1 km, and a factor of 4 at 1.35 km.  The dose is dominated by the fission product 
inventory generated in the accident initiating pulse.  The dose fraction attributed to the accident 
initiating pulse is more than 25 times greater than that from the fission product build up from 
previous operations.   
Table 6-4 shows the results if all of the inventory is released from the reactor.  These results are 
about a factor of 10 greater than the results using the more realistic release fractions.  Releasing 
all of the inventory is not realistic but is presented to inform the reader on what the upper bound 
dose could be. 
The PAVAN results are shown in Table 6-5 using the material release fractions in Table 6-1.  
Downwind dose estimates are presented for 0.1 km, 0.5 km, and 1.6 km.  These values represent 
the possible site boundary, exclusion boundary, and distance to the Steve Schiff auditorium, 
respectively.  The results show that using the release fractions from Table 6-1, the downwind 
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dose for a 15 times nominal pulse inventory is 15.5 rem at the proposed site boundary of 100 m.  
The dose at the proposed exclusion boundary of 500 m is 1.03 rem, which is close to the value 
found using MACCS.  The dose estimate at the Steve Schiff auditorium is 0.19 rem.  Just as for 
MACCS, the PAVAN dose result is dominated by the fission product inventory generated in the 
accident initiating pulse.  The dose fraction attributed to the accident initiating pulse is more than 
50 times greater than that from the fission product build up from previous operations. 
 
Table 6-3.  Downwind Dose Estimates Using MACCS and Material Release Fractions. 
Condition 
Dose (Rem) at 
0.35 – 0.55 km 
Dose (Rem) at 
0.95– 1.05 km 
Dose (Rem) at 
1.30 – 1.40 km 
Pulse 25 MJ with   
10 min decay 
0.055 0.021 0.013 
15 x Pulse 25 MJ 
with 10 min decay 
0.82 0.31 0.20 
300 W for 29 days 
with 1 day decay 
0.030 0.0058 0.0042 
 
Table 6-4.  Downwind Dose Estimates Using MACCS Assuming Complete Release. 
Condition 
Dose (Rem) at 
0.35 – 0.55 km 
Dose (Rem) at 
0.95– 1.05 km 
Dose (Rem) at 
1.30 – 1.40 km 
Pulse 25 MJ with   
10 min decay 
0.56 0.14 0.082 
15 x Pulse 25 MJ 
with 10 min decay 
8.42 2.09 1.22 
300 W for 29 days 
with 1 day decay 
0.30 0.070 0.042 
 
Table 6-5.  Downwind Dose Estimates Using PAVAN and Material Release Fractions. 
Condition 
Dose (Rem) at 
0.1 km W 
Dose (Rem) at 
0.5 km SW 
Dose (Rem) at 
1.6 km N 
Pulse 25 MJ with   
10 min decay 
1.04 0.069 0.013 
15 x Pulse 25 MJ 
with 10 min decay 
15.5 1.03 0.19 
300 W for 29 days 
with 1 day decay 
0.25 0.016 0.0031 
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These results conclude that the ZEDNA reactor could be sited at the TA-IV Z-machine facility 
and maintain low downwind dose levels at the site boundary and proposed exclusion boundary in 
the event of a hypothetical accident.  The dose at 500 m using the MACCS and PAVAN results 
is approximately 1 rem for a hypothetical accident where 15 times the nominal energy is 
deposited in the fuel as the initiating event for the accident.  This result is significantly below the 
25 rem evaluation guideline.  This result indicates that no safety-class SSCs would be required 
for the reactor containment or ventilation systems.  This analysis did not include any downwind 
dose estimates associated with experiments that may be performed in ZEDNA.  It would be 
expected that potential accidents using experiments containing plutonium could result in much 
higher downwind dose results and that these types of experiment capsules could require the use 
of safety-class SSCs.  The downwind dose results presented assumed unmitigated release of the 
fission products from the containment vessel and building.  These results would be much higher 
than the actual values since the containment vessel and building would maintain filtered exhaust 
that would allow for plate-out and capture of most of the volatile and semi-volatile elements. 
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7 Conclusions and Major Issues 
FBRs have played a major role in neutron radiation testing over the past decades.  However, 
since these types of reactors require HEU fuel to operate reliably, they are being shutdown due to 
security costs and protection issues.  The SPR-III is the only high-fluence FBR left in the US and 
is no longer available (since October 2006).  If fast, pulsed neutron irradiation testing is required 
in the future, these capabilities will not exist.  LEU fueled reactors are not conducive for pulsed 
operations.  However, an LEU fueled reactor with an external pulsed neutron source (EDNA 
device) is technically viable in achieving neutron fluences and pulse widths similar to the SPR-
III capability.  No large EDNA device to perform this task has ever been built.  The reason for 
this is that none were needed while FBRs were available.  There are no technical reasons that 
such a system could not be built and operated reliably.  Several types of pulsed neutron sources 
exist or could be developed to provide a sufficient number of initial source neutrons to reach the 
SPR-III capabilities.  The reactor design is relatively straightforward and can be similar to the 
SPR-III design except for using LEU fuel.  This report has focused on using the ZR machine and 
a D-T target to produce the initial burst of neutrons.  Other device drivers could be envisioned 
using the same reactor design presented in this report.    
 
An EDNA concept using the ZR machine is technically feasible.  Initial scoping calculations 
show that with the ZEDNA at $0.80 supercritical and a neutron pulse source of 4 x 1015 14-MeV 
neutrons at the top of the core, a neutron fluence and pulse width similar to the SPR-III reactor 
can be achieved.  The previous ZEDNA report (Parma, et al., 2007) focused on the technical 
feasibility of the ZEDNA concept.  This report has provided more details on the operational 
aspects of a ZEDNA device, the MITL design, hypothetical accident conditions, and downwind 
dose estimates for hypothetical accidents.  The conclusion of this report is that a ZEDNA device 
can be made to operate safely without undue risk to the public, collocated worker, and worker.  
Control and shutdown of the reactor is straightforward and can be achieved using standard 
research reactor instrumentation and control methodologies. 
 
A number of major issues, however, still exist and will require further investigation in order to 
further the pursuit of a ZEDNA device.  These major issues include cost effectiveness, safety 
basis and approval, and D-T target design and effectiveness in operating an ENDNA-type reactor 
at the Z facility.  A cost estimate was presented in the previous report for the design and 
construction of the ZEDNA.  This initial investment cost, in addition to the operational costs 
associated with a nuclear facility and the Z machine, must be shown to be reasonable and 
acceptable by the user community.  The downwind dose estimates presented in this report show 
that hypothetical accidents for the reactor would not pose excessive risk to the public.  However, 
the implications in making TA-IV, or a region therein, the site boundary for a nuclear facility, 
are uncertain, since it is not a new facility and no facilities within TA-IV are nuclear facilities.  
The fact that the Z facility would not necessarily be treated as a nuclear facility at all times has 
additional issues that would be required to be addressed and negotiated with the DOE.  Also, to 
operate the ZEDNA, effectively, a D-T source with an extended MITL would be required, which 
has yet to be tested.  Neutron production performance and shot-to-shot reproducibility are two of 
several important metrics that must be characterized. 
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A Appendix – ZEDNA Fission Product Activity 
 
For all accidents that involve the reactor, it was assumed that the reactor has been operating in 
the pulse mode for 30 days prior to the accident.  The reactor is assumed to have pulsed every 
day at 25 MJ per pulse.  In order to determine the fission product pre-accident inventory, a power 
level of 300 W (equivalent to 25 MJ divided by 24 hours per day and 3600 seconds per hour) 
was assumed over a 29 day period with a 24 hour decay period leading up to the accident 
condition.  The inventory for a 25 MJ pulse was also calculated with a 10 minute decay period.  
The pulse inventory was then scaled appropriately to reflect the amount of fission energy in the 
accident event.  The fission product inventory was calculated using the computer code 
ORIGEN2 (Croff 1983).  The calculated fission product inventory for the 25 MJ pulse with a 10 
minute decay and the 300 W operation for 29 days with a 24 hour decay is shown in Table A-1.  
This inventory represents the MARi values used in determining the source term, RSi.   
 
Table A-1.  Fission Product Activity Following a ZEDNA Pulse. 
 
Isotope 
Activity (Ci) 
25 MJ Pulse 
(10 min decay) 
Activity (Ci) 
300 W for 29 days 
(1 day decay) 
Gases   
Kr-83m 3.79E-01 5.66E-03 
Kr-85 3.03E-06 3.48E-03 
Kr-85m 1.23E+01 7.91E-02 
Kr-87 7.26E+01 1.31E-05 
Kr-88 4.90E+01 2.58E-02 
Xe-131m 4.53E-07 5.42E-02 
Xe-133 2.66E-03 1.48E+01 
Xe-133m 5.74E-03 4.44E-01 
Xe-135 1.30E+00 5.73E+00 
Xe-135m 2.38E+01 1.94E-01 
Xe-138 6.32E+02 0.00E+00 
Halogens   
Br-82 1.65E-04 2.68E-04 
Br-83 7.60E+00 1.46E-03 
Br-84 6.08E+01 6.79E-14 
I-130 6.02E-04 2.68E-04 
I-131 2.68E-02 1.53E-04 
I-132 7.92E-01 6.74E+00 
I-133 3.80E+00 9.46E+00 
I-134 8.73E+01 7.51E+00 
I-135 3.57E+01 4.61E-07 
 
 
 
69 
 
Isotope 
Activity (Ci) 
25 MJ Pulse 
(10 min decay) 
Activity (Ci) 
300 W for 29 days 
(1 day decay) 
Semi-Volatiles   
Se-81 2.12E+01 4.01E-10 
Se-81m 1.48E-01 2.71E-10 
Se-83 1.78E+01 3.06E-20 
Ru-103 1.38E-01 3.22E+00 
Ru-105 6.45E+00 6.80E-02 
Ru-106 2.56E-03 7.48E-02 
Te-125m 2.45E-08 1.58E-04 
Te-127 1.55E-03 6.52E-01 
Te-127m 4.63E-06 1.62E-02 
Te-129 1.49E+00 1.65E-01 
Te-129m 9.64E-04 1.59E-01 
Te-131 6.67E+01 1.24E-01 
Te-131m 3.14E-01 5.50E-01 
Te-132 2.23E+00 9.17E+00 
Te-133 4.79E+02 1.39E-08 
Te-133m 8.50E+01 8.31E-08 
Te-134 3.11E+02 6.80E-10 
Cs-134 8.55E-08 5.38E-06 
Cs-135 8.46E-12 3.76E-07 
Cs-135m 3.14E-02 1.31E-11 
Cs-136 2.38E-03 3.47E-02 
Cs-137 8.23E-04 2.77E-02 
Cs-138 1.82E+02 9.73E-13 
Other Non-Volatiles   
Ag-109m 1.31E+00 9.43E-02 
Ag-111 3.65E-03 1.42E-01 
Ag-112 2.03E-02 7.27E-02 
As-77 1.45E-02 3.71E-02 
Ba-139 9.77E+01 1.03E-04 
Ba-140 8.90E-01 1.13E+01 
Ba-141 5.46E+02 0.00E+00 
Ba-142 6.45E+02 0.00E+00 
Cd-115 1.61E-02 8.62E-02 
Cd-115m 1.54E-04 4.14E-03 
Ce-141 1.55E-03 6.75E+00 
Ce-143 2.76E+00 8.70E+00 
Ce-144 3.10E-02 8.98E-01 
Eu-155 1.37E-05 1.47E-03 
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Isotope 
Activity (Ci) 
25 MJ Pulse 
(10 min decay) 
Activity (Ci) 
300 W for 29 days 
(1 day decay) 
Eu-156 4.05E-05 4.08E-02 
Ge-77 2.45E-02 4.00E-03 
In-115m 3.25E-04 9.35E-02 
La-140 1.03E-02 1.18E+01 
La-141 1.94E+01 2.35E-01 
La-142 6.75E+01 3.31E-04 
La-143 6.07E+02 0.00E+00 
Mo-101 5.53E+02 0.00E+00 
Mo-99 3.46E+00 1.11E+01 
Nb-95 6.94E-06 1.13E+00 
Nb-95m 1.80E-05 2.60E-02 
Nb-96 9.49E-04 6.82E-04 
Nb-97 3.33E+00 5.48E+00 
Nb-97m 1.31E+01 5.16E+00 
Nd-147 1.45E-01 4.61E+00 
Nd-149 2.30E+01 1.85E-04 
Nd-151 4.81E+01 0.00E+00 
Pd-109 1.31E+00 9.42E-02 
Pm-147 3.44E-07 6.91E-02 
Pm-148 5.34E-07 1.46E-05 
Pm-148m 2.93E-08 4.58E-06 
Pm-149 3.70E-02 2.06E+00 
Pm-151 2.64E-01 6.07E-01 
Pr-143 5.33E-04 1.03E+01 
Pr-144 2.72E-02 8.98E-01 
Pr-144m 4.33E-03 1.08E-02 
Pr-145 2.71E+01 5.91E-01 
Pr-147 3.13E+02 0.00E+00 
Rb-86 8.99E-06 1.61E-04 
Rb-88 1.89E+01 2.88E-02 
Rb-89 4.81E+02 0.00E+00 
Rh-103m 1.45E-02 2.90E+00 
Rh-105 4.90E-02 2.04E+00 
Rh-106 2.56E-03 7.48E-02 
Sb-125 6.18E-05 4.35E-03 
Sb-126 2.46E-04 3.76E-03 
Sb-127 4.94E-02 6.80E-01 
Sb-128a 1.91E-01 1.71E-02 
Sb-129 7.43E+00 5.22E-02 
Sb-130 1.40E+01 1.01E-11 
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Isotope 
Activity (Ci) 
25 MJ Pulse 
(10 min decay) 
Activity (Ci) 
300 W for 29 days 
(1 day decay) 
Sb-131 2.23E+02 1.02E-18 
Sm-151 2.14E-08 6.40E-04 
Sm-153 1.12E-01 3.40E-01 
Sn-119m 3.38E-06 1.53E-04 
Sn-121 8.13E-02 7.44E-02 
Sn-123 1.77E-04 4.89E-03 
Sn-125 4.94E-03 5.80E-02 
Sn-128 2.10E+01 6.51E-08 
Sr-89 3.60E-02 3.71E+00 
Sr-90 9.52E-04 2.59E-02 
Sr-91 2.36E+01 2.45E+00 
Sr-92 8.25E+01 3.14E-02 
Tc-101 2.68E+02 0.00E+00 
Tc-104 2.16E+02 0.00E+00 
Tc-99m 5.73E-02 1.06E+01 
Y-90 1.70E-04 2.65E-02 
Y-91 9.66E-04 4.05E+00 
Y-91m 1.80E+00 1.56E+00 
Y-92 2.93E+00 4.62E-01 
Y-93 1.53E+01 3.09E+00 
Y-94 5.69E+02 0.00E+00 
Y-95 7.77E+02 0.00E+00 
Zr-95 8.35E-02 4.24E+00 
Zr-97 1.38E+01 5.45E+00 
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B Appendix – Downwind Dose Conversion Results Using 
MACCS 
 
The Melcor Accident Consequence Code System Version 2 (MACCS2) computer model 
(Chanin and Young, 1997) was used in the form of an isotopic database as a function of 
downwind distance.  This database was developed for TA-V nuclear facilities (Naegeli, 2003) 
and is used exclusively for calculating release estimates in the nuclear facilities documented 
safety analysis.  The assumption in using this database is that the directional wind data and 
atmospheric stability classes for TA-IV are similar to TA-V.  This is believed to be true since the 
two areas are in relative close proximity to each other.  Table B-1 shows a portion of this 
database for fission product isotopes and downwind distances of 0.35 m to 0.55 m, 0.95 km to 
1.05 km, and 1.30 km to 1.40 km.  This table presents the results for a ground release (no stack) 
of the source term, which is conservative.  The downwind dose TEDE at the receptor is found by 
multiplying each value by the corresponding isotope released from the facility.   
 
Table B-1.  Downwind Dose Conversion Using MACCS – Ground Release. 
Isotope 
Dose (Rem/Ci) at 
0.35 – 0.55 km 
Dose (Rem/Ci) at 
0.95– 1.05 km 
Dose (Rem/Ci) at 
1.30 – 1.40 km 
Gases    
Kr-83m 5.69E-10 2.98E-10 2.24E-10 
Kr-85 4.58E-08 2.52E-08 1.99E-08 
Kr-85m 2.98E-06 1.51E-06 1.14E-06 
Kr-87 1.52E-05 7.98E-06 5.92E-06 
Kr-88 5.34E-05 2.98E-05 2.26E-05 
Xe-131m 1.52E-07 8.27E-08 6.42E-08 
Xe-133 6.03E-07 3.25E-07 2.52E-07 
Xe-133m 5.58E-07 2.98E-07 2.32E-07 
Xe-135 4.57E-06 2.52E-06 1.99E-06 
Xe-135m 6.45E-06 2.58E-06 1.37E-06 
Xe-138 3.95E-05 1.96E-05 1.24E-05 
Halogens    
Br-82 7.05E-04 1.21E-04 1.01E-04 
Br-83 1.74E-05 3.40E-06 2.14E-06 
Br-84 1.07E-04 2.78E-05 1.19E-05 
I-130 8.72E-04 2.09E-04 1.08E-04 
I-131 7.05E-03 1.19E-03 9.97E-04 
I-132 3.20E-04 7.66E-05 5.11E-05 
I-133 1.09E-03 3.09E-04 1.31E-04 
I-134 2.13E-04 5.30E-05 3.16E-05 
I-135 5.07E-04 1.09E-04 7.15E-05 
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Isotope 
Dose (Rem/Ci) at 
0.35 – 0.55 km 
Dose (Rem/Ci) at 
0.95– 1.05 km 
Dose (Rem/Ci) at 
1.30 – 1.40 km 
Semi-Volatiles    
Se-81 3.35E-06 7.45E-07 3.34E-07 
Se-81m 1.74E-05 3.38E-06 2.14E-06 
Se-83 1.07E-04 2.29E-05 1.17E-05 
Ru-103 2.01E-03 4.76E-04 2.20E-04 
Ru-105 2.05E-04 5.11E-05 3.03E-05 
Ru-106 1.01E-01 2.15E-02 1.11E-02 
Te-125m 1.13E-03 3.25E-04 2.05E-04 
Te-127 6.91E-05 1.17E-05 7.85E-06 
Te-127m 4.17E-03 1.04E-03 5.40E-04 
Te-129 2.05E-05 5.03E-06 2.21E-06 
Te-129m 5.04E-03 1.08E-03 7.05E-04 
Te-131 1.03E-04 2.10E-05 1.07E-05 
Te-131m 1.29E-03 3.37E-04 2.11E-04 
Te-132 2.05E-03 5.08E-04 3.02E-04 
Te-133 3.37E-05 1.00E-05 5.12E-06 
Te-133m 3.02E-04 7.10E-05 3.31E-05 
Te-134 2.01E-04 5.07E-05 3.02E-05 
Cs-134 1.01E-02 2.15E-03 1.11E-03 
Cs-135 9.87E-04 2.12E-04 1.09E-04 
Cs-135m 1.10E-04 3.13E-05 2.00E-05 
Cs-136 1.96E-03 4.38E-04 2.20E-04 
Cs-137 7.05E-03 1.19E-03 9.97E-04 
Cs-138 1.15E-04 3.24E-05 2.06E-05 
Other Non-Volatiles    
Ag-109m 3.20E-09 5.12E-10 1.86E-10 
Ag-111 1.08E-03 3.07E-04 1.21E-04 
Ag-112 2.09E-04 5.20E-05 3.06E-05 
As-77 2.07E-04 5.16E-05 3.05E-05 
Ba-139 3.26E-05 7.63E-06 5.06E-06 
Ba-140 7.70E-04 2.02E-04 1.05E-04 
Ba-141 5.02E-05 1.04E-05 5.32E-06 
Ba-142 5.73E-05 1.12E-05 7.35E-06 
Cd-115 9.20E-04 2.10E-04 1.09E-04 
Cd-115m 8.72E-03 2.08E-03 1.08E-03 
Ce-141 1.74E-03 4.00E-04 2.18E-04 
Ce-143 7.22E-04 1.51E-04 1.02E-04 
Ce-144 7.36E-02 1.89E-02 1.03E-02 
Eu-155 8.40E-03 2.05E-03 1.07E-03 
Eu-156 3.07E-03 7.28E-04 3.39E-04 
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Isotope 
Dose (Rem/Ci) at 
0.35 – 0.55 km 
Dose (Rem/Ci) at 
0.95– 1.05 km 
Dose (Rem/Ci) at 
1.30 – 1.40 km 
Ge-77 3.43E-04 1.00E-04 5.24E-05 
In-115m 5.04E-05 1.08E-05 7.06E-06 
La-140 1.10E-03 3.16E-04 2.01E-04 
La-141 1.07E-04 3.01E-05 1.17E-05 
La-142 3.09E-04 7.38E-05 4.18E-05 
La-143 1.12E-05 3.05E-06 1.14E-06 
Mo-101 5.34E-05 1.10E-05 7.24E-06 
Mo-99 8.40E-04 2.05E-04 1.06E-04 
Nb-95 1.09E-03 3.12E-04 1.72E-04 
Nb-95m 5.08E-04 1.09E-04 7.14E-05 
Nb-96 8.72E-04 2.08E-04 1.08E-04 
Nb-97 7.59E-05 2.01E-05 1.05E-05 
Nb-97m 1.36E-06 2.56E-07 1.19E-07 
Nd-147 1.11E-03 3.20E-04 2.03E-04 
Nd-149 8.74E-05 2.08E-05 1.07E-05 
Nd-151 3.08E-05 7.06E-06 3.18E-06 
Pd-109 2.09E-04 5.23E-05 3.07E-05 
Pm-147 7.70E-03 2.02E-03 1.05E-03 
Pm-148 2.20E-03 5.29E-04 3.12E-04 
Pm-148m 5.08E-03 1.08E-03 7.09E-04 
Pm-149 5.94E-04 1.14E-04 7.50E-05 
Pm-151 3.78E-04 1.02E-04 5.30E-05 
Pr-143 1.39E-03 3.35E-04 2.12E-04 
Pr-144 7.57E-06 1.17E-06 7.49E-07 
Pr-144m 2.04E-06 5.98E-07 3.23E-07 
Pr-145 1.11E-04 3.16E-05 2.00E-05 
Pr-147 3.08E-05 7.05E-06 3.17E-06 
Rb-86 1.10E-03 3.15E-04 2.01E-04 
Rb-88 3.27E-05 7.45E-06 3.62E-06 
Rb-89 7.24E-05 1.21E-05 9.40E-06 
Rh-103m 1.01E-06 2.10E-07 1.08E-07 
Rh-105 2.05E-04 5.11E-05 3.02E-05 
Rh-106 1.04E-07 1.22E-08 4.00E-09 
Sb-125 5.08E-04 1.09E-04 7.16E-05 
Sb-126 1.12E-03 3.23E-04 2.05E-04 
Sb-127 6.11E-04 1.15E-04 7.57E-05 
Sb-128a 5.06E-05 1.03E-05 5.17E-06 
Sb-129 3.13E-04 7.49E-05 5.00E-05 
Sb-130 2.20E-04 5.31E-05 3.15E-05 
Sb-131 1.10E-04 3.14E-05 2.01E-05 
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Isotope 
Dose (Rem/Ci) at 
0.35 – 0.55 km 
Dose (Rem/Ci) at 
0.95– 1.05 km 
Dose (Rem/Ci) at 
1.30 – 1.40 km 
Sm-151 6.11E-03 1.15E-03 7.55E-04 
Sm-153 3.79E-04 1.02E-04 5.29E-05 
Sn-119m 1.08E-03 3.09E-04 1.22E-04 
Sn-121 1.02E-04 2.19E-05 1.13E-05 
Sn-123 6.91E-03 1.18E-03 9.04E-04 
Sn-125 3.10E-03 7.38E-04 3.41E-04 
Sn-128 2.36E-04 5.87E-05 3.23E-05 
Sr-89 1.09E-03 3.12E-04 1.71E-04 
Sr-90 5.04E-02 1.08E-02 7.05E-03 
Sr-91 3.23E-04 9.64E-05 5.22E-05 
Sr-92 3.05E-04 7.29E-05 3.40E-05 
Tc-101 1.10E-05 2.71E-06 1.11E-06 
Tc-104 7.55E-05 2.02E-05 1.03E-05 
Tc-99m 2.27E-05 5.39E-06 3.19E-06 
Y-90 1.50E-03 3.38E-04 2.15E-04 
Y-91 1.02E-02 2.17E-03 1.11E-03 
Y-91m 5.07E-05 1.07E-05 7.10E-06 
Y-92 2.01E-04 4.60E-05 2.19E-05 
Y-93 4.48E-04 1.05E-04 5.42E-05 
Y-94 5.27E-05 1.08E-05 7.11E-06 
Y-95 2.21E-05 5.22E-06 3.02E-06 
Zr-95 3.14E-03 7.51E-04 4.98E-04 
Zr-97 1.04E-03 2.51E-04 1.16E-04 
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C Appendix – Dispersion Coefficients Calculated Using 
PAVAN 
Wind Rose Data 
A meteorological tower has been in place 1 km north of the Z-machine facility in TA-IV for 
several years.  The hourly data from this tower has been made available for the years 2001 
through 2005 from SNL (Deola, 2007).  The data has been used to generate two wind rose 
diagrams shown in Figure C-1.  A wind rose diagram shows the frequency of the wind speed and 
direction over a time period.  The diagram on the left covers all 24 hrs of each day in the 5 year 
period.  The dominant wind condition is from the east.  The wind rose on the right covers the 
daytime hours from 6 AM until 8 PM.  During the period when there would likely be workers in 
the area, the dominant wind direction is from the west.  This is the normal pattern for winds in 
this area due to the presence of mountains and passes a few miles to the east of the site.  This 
implies that a release would generally go in a direction away from the parking lot, office 
buildings, and areas where people would normally traverse on the westerly side of the site. 
 
 
 
Figure C-1.  Wind Rose Displays of TA-IV Meteorological Data. 
 
PAVAN Results 
In this analysis, the meteorological data from the site was input into the PAVAN code to 
determine the site boundary location dilution value as well as a maximum directional 
independent value. The results from the code as a function of the site boundary are shown in 
Table C-1.  The maximum X/Q at all time intervals occurs in the southerly direction primarily 
due to the proximity of the fence to the building perimeter.  Note that the X/Q in the direction of 
the parking lot gate is less than 25% of the maximum value.  One could alternatively use a 
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constant site boundary distance of 100 m to perform the analysis in which case the maximum 
X/Q occurs in the westerly direction, primarily due to the low wind speeds.  The maximum X/Q 
value in the constant 100 m site boundary case is 0.00465 s/m3, which is half the maximum value 
given in the Table C-1.   
Table C-1.  Site Boundary Atmospheric Dilution Coefficients (s/m3)  
SECTOR  
DISTANCE 
(m)
0 - 2 
HOURS
0 - 8 
HOURS
8 - 24 
HOURS
1 - 4 
DAYS
4 - 30 
DAYS
N 235 8.47E-04 4.47E-04 3.24E-04 1.62E-04 5.98E-05
NNE 227 7.54E-04 3.95E-04 2.85E-04 1.41E-04 5.15E-05
NE 298 5.16E-04 2.65E-04 1.89E-04 9.17E-05 3.24E-05
ENE 189 8.48E-04 4.51E-04 3.29E-04 1.66E-04 6.21E-05
E 97 1.76E-03 9.81E-04 7.33E-04 3.89E-04 1.57E-04
ESE 82 2.52E-03 1.41E-03 1.05E-03 5.56E-04 2.23E-04
SE 63 7.14E-03 3.75E-03 2.71E-03 1.35E-03 4.95E-04
SSE 68 1.18E-03 6.26E-04 4.55E-04 2.27E-04 8.41E-05
S 62 9.27E-03 4.72E-03 3.37E-03 1.62E-03 5.65E-04
SSW 80 6.00E-03 3.21E-03 2.35E-03 1.19E-03 4.51E-04
SW 101 4.40E-03 2.46E-03 1.84E-03 9.78E-04 3.95E-04
WSW 227 1.08E-03 5.99E-04 4.46E-04 2.36E-04 9.44E-05
W 221 1.18E-03 6.29E-04 4.58E-04 2.31E-04 8.61E-05
WNW 149 2.15E-03 1.14E-03 8.24E-04 4.12E-04 1.52E-04
NW 194 1.37E-03 7.41E-04 5.46E-04 2.81E-04 1.08E-04
NNW 255 8.27E-04 4.37E-04 3.18E-04 1.59E-04 5.90E-05  
 
A similar calculation was performed for the Low Population Zone (LPZ) distances from the Z-
machine facility.  The results of this analysis are shown in Table C-2.  In this case the maximum 
X/Q value is found is in the south westerly direction (0.000308 s/m3) due to the minimum 
distance to Pennsylvania Avenue (500 m) used in the calculation.  
 
Table C-2.  Low Population Zone Atmospheric Dilution Coefficients (s/m3) 
SECTOR  
DISTANCE 
(m)
0 - 2 
HOURS
0 - 8 
HOURS
8 - 24 
HOURS
1 - 4 
DAYS
4 - 30 
DAYS
N 1600 5.80E-05 2.72E-05 1.86E-05 8.18E-06 2.51E-06 Schiff Auditorium
NNE 2500 2.79E-05 1.25E-05 8.39E-06 3.52E-06 1.01E-06 Eubank Gate
NE 3000 2.55E-05 1.10E-05 7.26E-06 2.93E-06 7.93E-07 4-Hills Housing
ENE 1600 4.06E-05 1.89E-05 1.29E-05 5.62E-06 1.70E-06
E 1600 2.88E-05 1.38E-05 9.58E-06 4.31E-06 1.37E-06
ESE 1600 2.87E-05 1.39E-05 9.72E-06 4.44E-06 1.44E-06
SE 1600 4.85E-05 2.32E-05 1.61E-05 7.22E-06 2.29E-06
SSE 1800 1.12E-05 5.05E-06 3.39E-06 1.43E-06 4.13E-07 Golf Course
S 1600 6.24E-05 2.97E-05 2.05E-05 9.18E-06 2.89E-06
SSW 1600 6.34E-05 3.19E-05 2.26E-05 1.08E-05 3.69E-06
SW 500 3.08E-04 1.74E-04 1.31E-04 7.05E-05 2.90E-05 Pennsylvania Rd
WSW 1600 6.62E-05 3.38E-05 2.41E-05 1.16E-05 4.07E-06
W 750 1.55E-04 8.20E-05 5.97E-05 3.00E-05 1.11E-05 Wyoming Rd
WNW 1600 6.48E-05 3.17E-05 2.21E-05 1.02E-05 3.33E-06
NW 10000 1.00E-05 4.25E-06 2.77E-06 1.10E-06 2.89E-07 Downtown
NNW 2100 4.73E-05 2.21E-05 1.51E-05 6.60E-06 2.01E-06 Base Housing  
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Distribution 
 
1    MS0736 John Kelly, 6770 
1    MS0748  Gary Rochau, 6763 
1    MS0748 Benjamin Cipiti, 6763 
1    MS1056 Samuel Myers, 1112 
1    MS1136 Paul Pickard, 6771 
1    MS1136   Curtis Peters, 6771 
1    MS1136 Terence Heames, 6771 
10  MS1136 Edward Parma, 6771 
1    MS1141 Richard Coats, 1383 
1 MS1141 Michael Gregson, 1383 
1 MS1142 Darren Talley, 1381 
1    MS1146 Patrick Griffin, 1384 
1    MS1146 Ahti Suo-Anttila, 1384 
1   MS1159 James Bryson, 1344 
1    MS1167 Frederick Hartman, 1343 
1    MS1169  James Lee, 1300 
1    MS1178  Finis Long, 1637 
1    MS1178  Randall McKee, 1639 
1    MS1178 David Smith, 1639 
1    MS1179 Mark Hedemann, 1340 
1    MS1186 Thomas Mehlhorn, 1674 
1    MS1193 Daniel Sinars, 1673 
1    MS1415 Charles Barbour, 1120 
2  MS9018 Central Technical Files, 8944 
2 MS0899 Technical Library, 4536 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
